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CHAIRMAN HERSCHEL ROSENTHAL: I'm Senator Herschel 
Senate Energy and Public Utilities Committee. This Joint Committee 
to the recent wave of merger activities California. 
As a of increased and other 
we have witnessed in the last few months a number of 
restructure the utility industry in California and the nation. 
I want to know how these will 
which could 
and 
are by utilities. I also want to find out whether the laws and on the books 
sufficient to protect the public against adverse impacts which may result from these billion dollar 
mergers. 
I regret to say that most of the utility witnesses that are in the best to 
on what to expect from mergers have suddenly to This 
been scheduled for months, during which time these utilities have talked to the press -- and have 
even run full-page newspaper ads to communicate their views. This is a reduction of a 
that appeared in a number of newspapers. They have also talked to Wall Street financial 
Public Utilities Commission, federal agencies, the courts, shareholders, 
affected groups. And they assured me repeatedly that they would testify today. 
Now we are suddenly told that, upon advice of counsel, cannot talk to the 
and other 
Southern California Edison and San Diego Gas and Electric Company cannot coordinate their 
affairs in a manner which conforms to their longstanding commitments to the then I 
wonder if either is of a restructured 
I am certain that from each of these utilities are 
I want to let you know that I have advised members of this 
intention to schedule a 
necessary, from each of those 
to 
which refused 
ect 
Hu•u.•,u=: the 
hour of most and excellent 
scheduled. 
In our first 
associated with 
this 
mergers and 
we will get an overview of some of the national trends and issues 
in our second we receive 
from state and local """''"'''"'~"~ 
third consumers, and other 
groups to be affected by the California mergers. we will close the 
with an open session to take brief comments from persons whose 
the Those to at open session 
their name on the sheet which is available from the Committee 
this 
concern in this is to benefits or harm 
no more tha."l to 15 minutes. And I will inform you, when you are 
ask you to sum because to 
to halt 
anybody to go 
the entire ~"'~~··~c·• be which exceeds this 
the Committee welcomes written comments at this time or filed soon after the 
added to our information. 
I was 
over at this 
to turn the -- I'd like to turn the hearing -- I was going to turn the 
to Chairwoman Moore and other legislators who may have an opening 
guess the plane is a little bit late for some of the Members. But at this point, let me ask 
the other Members of the Committee if would like to make a comment. We 
an Elihu Wright, and Assemblyman Frazee. Any comment? 
four witnesses for the first -- Robert Professor Fellmeth, David 
Grosswiler --
mike there so you can 
come up to the front here. Yes. Two behind and two -- and you 
it up. 
with Robert a Director of Merrill Lynch Capital Markets. 
ROBERT KING: trouble the microphone ... 
ROSENTHAL: No mikes? Is there a switch ~4~ ... .,...,. 
that on? 
of your ... 
ROSENTHAL: That's on, and you can put that on your tie, if you 
hold it. 
G: Is that now? 
so you 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: fine. 
KING: let's that everything else works a little easier in 
started. 
narne Bob King. I'm a __ ,_,_,., .. ,.., Director of the Merrill Lynch Capital Markets group in 
Public Utilities Division. I've worked in this area for about ZO years. On behalf of my firm, I 
to thank the comr. 'i ttees for the to participate in the discussion of a subject as 
as the potential for consolidation within the electric utility industry. 
The of the electric utility is of crucial importance to our overall quality of 
This is particularly clear when one considers the degree to which our economic system relies on 
reliable electric power. like to state for the record that neither I nor my firm is an 
advocate of, nor an opponent of, the concept of consolidation within the electric utility industry. It 
been my experience that these types of decisions are best made by the managers and directors of 
the affected groups. However, I would say that consolidation within the electric utility industry, to 
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the extent that it is economically and 
enhance the well-being of shareholders and ratepayers. 
the the 
and 
the 
environment within the electric 
is 
distribution of electric 
structure are about forces 
These forces include: Significant excess 
is elsewhere; two, the failure of public 
return on assets dedicated to 
m certain 
commissions in some areas 
owners 
these assets to recover their investments; three, advances which "'~~.,,~~ 
of inner-company generation into savings through power pooling; transmission limits 
for inter-region transfer; five, increased competition within franchised service territories 
from and independent power production; six, reduced construction 
generating capacity, from a slower pace of demand 
the on the of utilities to invest in facilities when the of loss not offset 
reward of enhanced return; and eight, increased from the 
imported electric power, particularly in the northeast. 
In addition to these competition is from of other forms of 
natural gas. electric utili ties are themselves 
intense from utilities and other areas of the from non-traditional 
electric energy and from other energy sources. In response then are 
order to meet this In a environment 
not decrease. 
One 
electric 
mergers will 
realities and 
financial criteria will be 
mergers. 
increase. 
increased 
to both of these 
the consolidation 
in the 
The uuu.-.Jri 
those which affect 
financial motivation investor-owned electric 
businesses. all such 
shal"eholder value. Shareholder values turn can be 
one 
mergers are 
fall 
costs 
these forces 
c 
of value the of utilities 
areas 
issues and and the third is 
These and structure 
shareholder cost reduction upon the 
and also the to retain at least a m 
has been stated 
of from consolidations within the electric 
some cases, different conclusions. At one end of the scale, the 
made that dramatic could be achieved number of 
to a number about 30 of that which now exists. On the 
the scale is the conclusion that 
efforts with the 
conclusion is that the 
that the most cost 
to load m anagem the 
from a merger could 
a.uu.u5 independent. I believe that a 
in between these two extremes. 
result from electric 
to efficiencies and facility 
and lower-cost transmission access. I would note, however, that cost 
can often be achieved without merger -- well-structured power exchange 
power and techniques such as asset dispositions, sale, 
transactions enable the utilities to on a of these savings without 
merger. 
affiliation of Cleveland Electric and Toledo Edison in Centerior the Ohio-
is the merger in the electric industry in recent 
appear to substantiate this middle-of-the-road conclusion. In on the 
from the merger, Ted 
about 
consolidation 
that others had ~~,.. .... ~~ 
on prospective 
Chief Financial 
of revenue, in 
indicated that Centerior had 
while that in 
made sense, doubt that some of the 
could be derived from massive consolidation. 
and I "We find that some of 
ected cost savings are overstated, at least in terms of our experience. Savings claimed that 
consolidation -- excuse me -· the studies claim that consolidation would save many millions in joint 
since the combined would use the lowest cost, energy available. 
coordinated dispatch between Cleveland Electric and 
came up with hard dollar savings of about $2 million a year. we, and 
believe the studies others have made may have underestimated the inherent savings, inner-
power transactions already by unaffiliated utilities." And that's close quote. 
cost are achievable through merger, and this must be determined through 
of each such --'-------'--' shareholder value can be increased only if such savings 
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can be retained at least in part by the benefit of shareholders. in many 
the regulatory discriminates against shareholders m 
that a of retained for 
than pass a 
this may be the most consolidation Without some 
assurance and a material can be retained a 
have little incentive to propose a.-•d shareholders have incentive 
consolidation true when we consider associated 
of transactions. 
One additional but very important consideration affecting shareholder value is the 
treatment of an acquisition premium. Today's environment may have to 
to facilitate what it believes to be an economically justified merger based on 
savings. However, if such a premium would reduce, not increase, its shareholder's value, 
means of offsetting this type of reduction in shareholder value is necessary to encourage 
of the merger. To the extent an acquisition premium is paid and justified 
must be permitted to recover that premium. 
As I mentioned earlier, another factor which will determine level of the 
these 
cost 
a 
merger 
activity is the ability of regulated entities to structure, finance, and merger transactions. 
Relevant in this regard are shareholder-related issues, regulatory issues and and 
management issues. These factors will determine the framework and structure for merger 
transactions that have been justified on economic ground. 
For a merger transaction to be consummated, generally, the of 
The character and ective of shareholders, are 
an acceptable transaction. Historically, a very of the common stock of 
electric as well as those of gas distribution and 
individual investors a 
of In the event of an unsolicited merger individuals 
more to a 
shareholders. 
utilities 
from individual 
other 
such a 
as well as anti-takeover 
been viewed as a 
unsolicited or merger attempt between utilities would be 
in recent years, a portion of electric and other held 
to succeed. 
institutional 
investors has the character of of 
at 
unfriendly merger 
of a shareholder of a utilities as to an 
The effect of regulatory issues ru"'1d the need for 
on the ability to any merger, either 
coordination with 
approvals, NRC, licensed transfer ru"'1d other 
will also have a material 
or unsolicited. 
federal and state 
for classification as a 
Act of 5 that any merger be 
extensive 
up--
would observe that consolidation 
considered managements of utili ties to 
environment. Or mergers that make economic sense will take 
the pace to 
doubt 
some 
benefits to their 
a 
not revolution. 
thesis that drastic 
This observation me to my 
merger would 
aware that managements involved in recent 
The extent that such benefits can be achieved 
factor in the necessary to these 
The owners of the business do not believe will share in any benefit. 
anagements and directors of these companies have found the regulatory allocation of benefits to be 
of to 
to little or no economic benefits to their shareholder. 
to this dilemma is easier to describe than it is to 
foster a level of confidence that shareholders of 
for will share in the benefit. This will, in the 
ergers that could reduce customer rates. 
I believe that 
which create 
encourage 
ROSENTHAL: Thank you. I have one question. I'm concerned about the 
Street investment bankers interested in mergers that focus on shareholder windfalls 
of other issues. mergers, involve corporations 
some vital services. How is this service factor accotu~ted for 
I believe my remarks at least if not stated, that any benefit to 
have to be from the merger. The , which 
California and every other will have a look at the 
to the merger and then have an to review them afterwards. I£ there are no 
there will not be any benefits to the shareholder. But my belief is, that if there 
the that the shareholders or the owners and managers of the business 
to go to the -- to take the risk of a merger to try and achieve savings that will 
on. I think there has to be a balance. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. Any questions from Members? All right. 
move onto the next Doctor-- I mean David Rosso, Partner of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, 
at Law. 
DAVID ROSSO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I'm pleased to have been invited to 
before you to discuss concerns with regard to mergers and acquisitions in the 
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utilities. 
ROSENTHAL: 
Is that 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: 
MR. ROSSO: Is that 
don't you pick up that 
fine. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: That's fine. 
MR. Let me say that the views that I'm 
not those of my firm. And let me also say 
either oppose nor favor the electric mergers and 
are 
neither I 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Let me just interrupt you for a moment. We have the Chair of the 
Assembly Committee, Assemblywoman Moore. I understand that your was late. 
see here. you would like to make an opening statement, I'm sure Mr. Rosso -- fine. 
Continue, please. 
MR. ROSSO: All right. I should start by noting a little historical perspective, and that that 
consolidation by merger and acquisition was rather common during the earlier history of the electric 
utility industry. However, until quite recently, there has been very little such for 
approximately the last quarter century. The first wave of mergers and 
of many essentially local operations into the 
1.10...'""'"' of the 1920s and '30s. After the passage of the Public U 
resulted 
the industry went through a lengthy period of substantial restructuring, which included 
mergers, and acquisitions, as a result of efforts to conform to the dictates that 
Now that of restructuring left us with an industry of 
or combination electric and gas most of which are 
each 
service area. These investor-owned utilities coexist 
owned 
desire to achieve and economies in 
years or 
These 
service and 
2.30 investor-owned 
service within 
of Rather than to achieve these 
the followed a different of 
such means as the formation of power the utilization of 
uuLAVH in jointly owned coordination and use of economy 
energy transactions. 
During the last two or three years, many will a 
substantial Some in the financial have reasoned m view of the 
cash flow, which many electric utilities outside investors will find it attractive to 
control of a utility's common stock in a tr~'lsaction at a in excess the 
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as common carriers of 
be customers 
coincided 
have ected a wave of in the 
basic must 
now face in 
as 
restructured consist of far fewer 
of an many more 
a few 
and 
transmission which serve, at 
a number of smaller distribution 
and transmission 
recent months? 
to LBOs and tender offers not seen the 
and tender offers from outsiders or from 
unction with There have been three such cases of any 
first is the Alamito 
which then became 
substCG~tial shareholder 
launched two unsuccessful tender 
which a had earlier spun certain 
war tender offer. In a 
the company for 
of the common stock and 
in excess of 50 of the common stock in open market 
shareholder's ective was to obtain control of the company in order to 
real estate assets were believed to have a value for 
case, Service Company of Indiana was 
investors. This group withdrew when the ru~d board of 
would oppose the investor group. 
area is the area of which has been in the news and has been the --
a to whether takeovers would occur of of a 
These have been motivated rates due to recent rate basing of 
investments and the current of the of abundant generating 
Certain are the possibility of acquiring all of the utility's 
within the boundades of the some of the utility's generating and 
but not all of the and not the nuclear capacity. 
and the City of New Orleans are apparently considering such proposals. Whether 
see such transactions is open to A significant concern is that the current 
of abundant for bulk power purchases may not continue into the 
future. There are also instances of the of sales of municipal systems to privately owned 
third of merger and transaction in the is probably germane 
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to the remaining smaller investor-owned electric 
company like Utilico:rp known as Missouri 
scattered smaller 
of what has been 
in the 
on for sometime in the water 
We have also seen similar 
of which there are still a 
Service 
natural gas 
for Arkla. While because of the scattered nature of the one cannot 
much in the way of efficiencies due to 
have the to more technical know-
the benefits of volume on a centralized 
processes; savings due to centralized accounting, data processing, and the cost of 
due to ease of securities issues for a 
The fourth of merger and acquisition and the one which is most 
interest to these committees, is the transaction which results in consolidation of substantial electric 
utility companies. It is here that we have seen most of the recent action. We have had in recent 
times the formation of Centerior, the holding company for Cleveland Electric and 
the Southern Company acquisition of Savannah the Utah Power & 
merger proposal; the acquisition of Nantahela by Duke Power; the :recent for a merger 
Central Maine an Central Vermont, in conjunction with an acquisition of the non-nuclear assets of 
Public Service Company of New Hampshire, which is currently in Chapter 11 
proceedings; and the two proposals affecting this city, the San Diego Gas & Electric-Tucson Electric 
proposal, and the SCE Corporation-San Diego Gas & Electric proposal. 
proposed industry consolidations include a variety of perceived benefits. 
management sophistication is not an issue, since such large utilities do not 
for such 
the 
level of management sophistication. However, administrative and general cost savings, as well as 
customer cost are often cited. While such 
to be on a very small scale to the of electric 
costs of enormous such as fuel maintenance costs and costs. The 
area of substantial 
and 
industrial load versus one with a residential or load. combination 
diverse customer mixes can result in improved 
financial and reduce costs of 
which in the 
from relative power 
from relative fuel costs and 
dispatch; from reduction in maintenance 
possibility of retirement and liquidation of 
These areas should be 
with 
assets and deferral of 
to power 
who are faced with a 
consolidation in order to determine the benefits of such a transaction. 
One important point to note is that such may be 
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such 
and the 
of 
to a rn erger or such as the mentioned realization of economies 
efforts increased power economic j 
coordination and the like. 
also bear that 
because such is essential to 
company, which 
of caution here with investors from 
to the table Such transactions 
or economic efficiencies. such efficiencies as may exist are 
overall concern about the extent to which short-term 
stressed in our economy to the exclusion of economic 
Such investors will be more than book value for the assets of the 
will have more dollars invested which they must earn a return on. They also 
a rate of return on their investment. Otherwise, they would be 
ective of a higher rate of return on stock. The way to 
investment is to increase 
as result of 
Even if this 
of some of the 
Their cost are to come 
results in lower short-term rates to 
realized leverage, higher leverage 
increases financial risk in a company. Since the business risk in a company is not likely to 
as a result of such a transaction, the company's total risk, which is equivalent to its financial 
business 
in 
must increase. in the long-run, cost of capital is likely to 
Except in the case of a utility which is in 
serious financial or in certain divestitures of utility 
confess to some benefits of such transactions. 
A few words about the current structure as it to mergers a...'ld acquisitions in 
tric at the federal level includes the SEC, the Federal 
Commission, Nuclear and the Department of Justice's 
Each of these may have on the nature of the 
The Antitrust Division will focus on the competitive aspects of a horizontal merger. 
will focus on the financial and competence of the resulting company in relation 
nuclear power pla...'lt. The SEC and FERC will basically look at the various public interest 
considerations which may be "!.ffected by the transaction. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Mr. Rosso, would you please end your summation. 
MR. ROSSO: All right. I think that the criteria that must be looked at by State regulators 
be listed as follows -- and some recent cases have listed some of these: 
that the proposed transaction meets the test that it is in the best interest of the 
consumers. 
Second, the effect of or absentee ownership. 
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the elimination 
the 
credit 
maintain a reasonable 
condition of any 
Seventh, the 
continue to be 
utilities. 
agencies. 
structures. 
financial 
financial 
the of economies. 
Nine, the effect on rates. 
fairness and reasonableness of shareholders. 
the effect of the transaction on the customer mix a..1d 
forecasts. 
ected demand 
Twelve, the effect of the transaction on with 
and other 
in the bulk power markets control over 
access. 
I would say that should beware of transactions which short-term 
In of 
meritorious 
will be 
a 
seem to be 
transaction meritorious. a merger two was 
turned down that basis. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. have -- first of I'd like to introduce 
two Members who have On my Senator Bill Craven-- welcome -- and 
Kille a who earn e a late. I notice that we have all of these 
here. That's All And others may arrive. legislators from San 
Let me ask a Mr. Rosso. The federal administrative law the Pacific 
Power & Light merger, which hear more about maintained that a merger was not needed 
to achieve the benefit. He that power and other contract 
- 1 
some the downside risks merger. 
comment is that the FERC will issue ail order 
not had a chance call my office 
come out the FERC is 
certain conditions to transmission access. 
think my remarks indicated that I do agree 
can be rather 
I think this has in a of the country already. That 
ean to say, 
that there 
agree with almost Mr. said. It doesn't mean to 
be situations in which the will be and that the 
you have a consolidation. There isn't or bad in this. I mean 
look at the transaction and you have 
akes sense. You who says all of them are bad is wrong; and 
them are is wrong, in my view. Now that's just my •.. 
ROSENTHAL: For number of reasons, I do not like hostile takeovers. 
may be when utilities. 
us an idea of what other states have done to mergers, including 
ROSSO: there has been no hostile takeovers which have occurred, that 
the statutes of the various states are well in line with the California 
that is, the better ones are. The California statute has a broad approval procedure which 
to consider the interest. a broad standard. It's almost 
scope. And it allows the commission to look at the various criteria. I hope that I 
that kind of a 
are which are to the 
I 
California. 
think you need additional legislation to 
think the commission has to look at the 
it has to make with to -- a 
mission in any new way 
has to make the first 
the standard be that will be consistent with the public interest or that it will 
two different standards. And as you undoubtedly know, they interest? 
been under various statute. Once it makes that determination, it can then 
the various criteria the Mr. and I have both discussed and it should be able to get a pretty 
feel for what the benefits of a transaction are. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ELIHU HARRIS: tell me one thing, please? I want to get 
You about the interest of the, the public interest. And I'm trying to 
understand what guidance, if any, the has relative to what that is, i.e., if there is a 
merger, there are certain benefits that may be achieved administrative consolidation, cost 
et the to streamline operations or, you know, make better use of 
- 12-
of the 
reimburse the 
But merger involves 
it involves a if you for the shares and there 
an an 
that back from the 
the direction is no more 
the f"'A1FY\t"I.-
How does the in that in the 
than the interest? 
agree with what Mr. has said on 
have a you want to look to see whether makes economic sense in the 
run. If it makes economic sense, there will be some benefits. can be either 
or improved quality of service. They can be in various categories. Once you determine that there is 
a net benefit from the then the question becomes: How do you that net benefit 
between the shareholders and the 
ASSEMBLYMAN HARRIS: All right. 
MR. ROSSO: If you wish to see consolidations take place, which result in net economic 
to the as a whole, then you must be willing to allow the shareholders to in some 
of those benefits. There must be a splitting of the benefits between the shareholders and the 
the shareholders won't do the very mergers and 
which you would wish them to do. That's the first point. 
As one of the costs of the merger, which perhaps have to be offset 
the very 
the 
may be the question of an acquisition premium and the question of how much of that will be 
be recovered over what of time for That is of what goes into 
the It is very that an the benefits that the merger 
should allowed to be recovered shareholders and that the in 
stress "long-run"; I think you want to look at the on this --and! 
would be better off the other economies that 
would offer 
earlier which 
Should we 
scope that 
as 
needs to look at or that o.r is it a matter f:rom your you 
reasonable men and women, Public Utilities Commission up their mind based on-- I mean 
some of these are 
MR. ROSSO: Yeah. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HARRIS: So 
judge. Obviously, it may be a first case first seen. 
MR. ROSSO: Well, no, I'm sorry. I guess I don't agree that their 
been some already. The standards which should be .•• 
HARRIS: I was about a hostile merger. You said 
which to 
There have 
not been a 
I think that the standards are very different with 
whether it makes economic sense between a hostile 
There may be additional costs because of a hostile takeover. That 
HARRIS: I think 
compa.."'ly -- and 
also in the 
mergers in other 
ers, but also have to 
VU.I'-'\..<,k of the <>TIO .. rMT 
an If you have to 
a matter of 
worth to you as to what it's worth to 
It may drive up the costs reason. 
fields where they can pass on the costs to 
with other people who provide that same product. If 
then there is only the PUC to stand between 
I guess I have two comments to make in response to that. The first is I 
competing when have an anyway, that is to say, that if it's 
it only means that the offer that was made was satisfactory to the management and 
company so that they struck a bargain. If it satisfactory, then 
would come in and offer a 
there is a lack of 
is when you say 
would say "only the 
the Public Utili ties 
the rates 
Commission. And I 
have been this 
n"''"'""" read all of the 
one, you see. So I think in the market sense, I 
in the agreed takeover. 
the Public Utilities Commission", I don't think any 
Commission"; nor do I think any potential acquirer 
because in the end, the cash flow, the revenues for a 
And in the it has to those rates to the 
know your California Public Utilities Commission. I 
But I would that they are 
as familiar with these 
and that won't have any 
criteria to the If they lawyers like me will 
them on them out. But I wouldn't be too concerned about 
ASSEMBLYMAN HARRIS: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTH.\L: Yes. Ms. Moore. 
GWEN Thank you. Let me direct my question to Mr. Rosso, I 
want to follow a little if I can, as I'm trying to understand, as Mr. Harris says, 
whole idea of the public trust -- and the idea, as you've pointed out, of hostile takeover in the 
field is a new phenomenon which you kind of vacillated between and said, "Maybe it's 
not so new." But I guess the real that I have, when we talk about this public interest, the 
whole notion of a utility being involved in this share of takeover and changing its operating form or 
it's or doing what is necessary when you diversify and do a variety of things is a little 
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different than the that is known the has been 
service area and do that well. But when you rriove 
:reconcile that 
MR. I guess I'll to answer your 
VVJt>..AU,~ for but 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I guess what I'm 
with that of a takeover which to 
is there to a service to the 
I'm not sure what is that 
for is: Tell me how do you :reconcile 
to its shareholders? California's 
that the :rates a:re to be reasonable and The 
move into a takeover, you may or may not be talking about reasonable and in the sense of 
trying to make up whatever the costs that may be passed on as a :result of that takeover. 
MR. ROSSO: Well, I agree with completely that the primary role of a public utility is to render 
and safe service to its customers at reasonable Now, there 
be some difference between me and somebody 
should be. But I think that ••. 
you and I, as to what reasonable rates 
MR. ROSSO: 
MOORE: You eliminated affordable. Is that not -- what do you think? .•• 
I don't know that standard. We don't have that out in the Midwest. I would 
~-'"'uu.u•.~ on how it's ... 
MOORE: Good reasons. 
MR. ROSSO: Pardon? 
MOORE: Reasonable cost. 
at a reasonable 
say 
MOORE: How you 
think that the commission is used to at 
AV\J!l,d.U"' at 
Now I say, that you have situation in 
have to be those 
think that 
whether 
benefits are 
as 
entities and who 
and safe service at 
be basic test. And 
20 years. I 
about net benefits now. 
that 
those net 
because it take If the 
shareholders don't some benefit 
their new benefits. I 
be to 
to look at the to determine whether 
which and the cost 
then has indicated --
Mr. -- that the shareholders would take a pay-
that. 
mean the difference and 
can, over a it would be reasonable to assume that the benefits would 
is 
so I have to assume that the same standards would to shareholders. 
may what I said with what he if you but that 
MOORE: you to him and I assumed that you were 
him for himself but I was to the 
had one, 
Let me ask you: Do you think the shareholders should 
one, I 
the 
I think you 
makes economic sense and I 
situation. 
to 
think 
so That one, I think made 
do make sense and I, you be on the other side on it. It 
It sounds to me like looked at these two 
that may be to render on whether makes sense or not in 
think I'm smart that give it here today. 
ROSENTHAL: 
MOORE: was to answer on pay-back. 
it may have been to your considerable advantage that you missed my remarks 
been late. 
if come in a merger, to have to demonstrate 
No public -- or it were 
I've won 
the way, 
started out with the 
commission would 
that came in and 
cost another 5 
that there will be 
to 
in 
c in Ohio about three years ago, and was involved in it. 
now say that 
made in sworn 
of their revenues in 
it. believe that those 
• That 
increase. 
action which has reduced total cost. I think that should be 
rate of return. I whether there should be a time 
My sense would be that that higher rate of return, the return-on-equity concept, where the PUC 
the return necessary to attract capital, 1 think when the take an action 
reduces cost, of that should into a return. what I think of as a 
sharing of benefits. That means it's going to cost the ratepayers less and the shareholders are going 
to get more. It's the two together. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: So you're saying that, that in some notion, that that would be 
on in part; they would split the difference, the ratepayers and the shareholders, in terms of •.. 
MR. KING: Without specifying how that would be split, yes. I think it has to be on 
both sides. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: But that has not occurred in Ohio as yet? 
MR. KING: They haven't had a rate case since -- they haven't completed a rate case since 
then. I believe that that is true. 
MR. ROSSO (?): There is one pending. 
MR. KING: Yeah, there is a rate case pending. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: There always is a rate case pending. (Laughter) Somehow or 
never seem to resolve it. Thank you. 
ROSENTHAL: 
ROBERT C. FRAZEE: Both of the discussions so far seem to treat the 
ect 
California 
mergers as if L"'-'"""a"" about pure 
are not 
And I think in the case of most 
utilities. 
diversification or are 
seems to me that that is a factor in all of this discussion. It should 
And it 
included. And I want to 
an Arizona utility that just announced, I for the first time in their history, 
that at a reduced dividend and that :reduction is as a result of their non-
And when the Public you 
where is their latitude at 
days. 
at all of these other diversifications on the of utili ties these 
MR. ROSSO: with you. think in the of 
diversified company, that a state commission should and 
must the look at the as a stand-alone I think that generally the 
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of a company has its own debt 
from the 
and 
businesses company. 0 
reflection the ups or the downs of those other then 
a merger or situation that the -- or a 
entities are to focus on the 
where to look for the 
to them. not in 
the interest in one way or another. my view. 
FRAZEE: that based on its attractiveness to 
overall that 
investor and therein costs for the of that 
I this at another forum. 
and his businesses do 
company goes into So what? The 
and 
be in 
which is in 
I 
op '!:rations should 
MOORE: Just 
interest. Under one of the 
be an asset of the 
have to come 
commission 
It may cost the Public 
Commission ouvu,Au 
return for a 
the economic situation is. 
agree, that in the •v•.u~.~-L 
or would affect the 
confidence that you do in that 
it will not 
the basis 
which may be 
the way I think 
that the 
financial of 
and to follow-up what he was asking-- it 
mergers to the stock would be diluted 
I think -- what is it? And then 
the rates in such a manner that the 
made whole again with that 6 percent that would be diluted the 
MR. ROSSO: Yeah, I hate to duck the question but I don't know what the ... 
let's a, a 
dilution of the .•• 
MR. you mean ? 
MOORE: That the stock would be down 6 and in order to 
back -- shares would be And it would then should the PUC the rates in 
such manner would make it whole? 
MR. ROSSO: You mean the value of the stock will be down 6 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: Right. 
MR. ROSSO: How can you tell that? 
MOORE: the way that -- the amount 
share. 
MR. ROSSO: You mean that San Diego is paying a premium for Tucson's shares in terms of 
the ••• 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: You paid a dilution of the overall. 
MR. ROSSO: Okay. And you're saying that the net book value per share of the combined 
company will be 6 percent lower than San Diego's current net book value? 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: That's correct. 
MR. ROSSO: Is that it? And then the question is: Should the commission in order to 
restore that 6 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: That's correct, collect back from the ratepayers back. 
MR. Well, I think the answer to that is -- and I really haven't thought this but 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: Mr. is his head so he wants to answer. 
MR. if wants he can be my 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN You can understand that. 
MR. the are 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN '"'""'-""'- This goes your 
MR. ROSSO: I utili ties should looked at in the and not in the 
short-run. think tried to make that clear in my statement. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I understand that. 
MR. ROSSO: But I mean I that if there are sufficient 
is the a new there to 
so that 
and if you 
you that 
of the 
split to be for the to restore the net book value vu.uu.~::. from the shareholders to 
there to restore the net book value per but 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: But the for some way down the road. 
And at what do the start restore it? 
MR. ROSSO: 
MR. KING: I 
this 
come into these 
at every 
of 
of the way--
that 
the 
there to be some reflection both some benefit 
Bob? 
my head in what I David was to say in which he 
did say. But as an in the Centerior merger in which have entered testimony 
the combination that are million a year and that to increase and 
that as the If there had been a dilution a premium paid, if there had 
1n I would argue that some amount of that dollar savings 
gone to cover that. 
the form of reduced rates. And let's say that one 
and I have not done these numbers and it may be inaccurate. That would 
I think one must focus on the to the ratepayers. But if that 
merger, 
achieve the merger. 
you disadvantage the shareholder as to 
And I think m agreement on there being 
for shareholders. And if there anything to share, then 
no economic benefit. 
guess the other is some things that are done 
basis and some that would 
or to the merger that may cause some savings. And I think 
to be some manner or some way or some vehicle in order to make the determination 
a cause the whether it was that had to have occurred 
MR. KING: I think that is best addressed 
I'm concerned about was ..• 
your commission looking at the facts in the future. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MC10RE: Was there a dilution in the Centerior ..• 
MR. KING: There is in one side or the other unless done strictly on a book-to-book 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: not with one of the proposed acquisitions for San Diego? 
MR. KING: this is a transaction which took place in 1985 or '86 in Ohio which I was 
one of two 
of about $55 (million), 
But subsequent to that in sworn testimony, the Chief 
have saved about 2.5 percent of their rates which resulted in a 
a year directly as a result of efficiencies arriving out of 
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the company. So my position, and I think David would 
the shareholders out of that. 
it, is you have to have 
ROSENTHAL: All Thank you very much. Let ask 
Committees is there any ections to cameras in the room? 
you okay. 
MR. KING (?): It's your right side, huh? (Laughter) 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Very good. Okay. Our next 
as 
Professor Robert 
Center for Public Interest Law, University of San Diego School of Law. Welcome to the 
PROFESSOR ROBERT C. FELLMETH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members 
Committee. My name is Bob Fellmeth. I'm a member of the faculty of the University of San 
Law School. I teach California Administrative Law and Practice, Consumer Antitrust Law and 
Regulated Industries. I direct the Center for Public Interest Law and edit 
California Regulatory Law Reporter. My publications include .c:T;_h_e_In~te.:..r_s_t:...;:a.....:t:..:e:.......:....:...~;;;....:.::...::...;;__;:_::;.::;:;;;..:.:.:..:=:_.:.::::' 
a study of the ICC; The Nader Report on the Federal Trade Commission, the 
1968; and the treatise, California Regulatory Law and Practice, with my colleague, Ralph Folsom. 
The Center for Public Interest Law has been involved in the representation of 
interests before the PUC since 1982, first through Michael Shames, proposing and 
consumer 
the case 
creating UCAN, the ratepayer group which interacts with San Diego Gas & Electric and 
recently representing the California telephone consumers in the commission's divestiture 
rate proceedings, now in their third year, and confirming Assemblywoman Moore's of the 
rate proceedings as interminable. I understand later witnesses will be commenting on the more 
specific issues raised by the SDG and alternatives and various merger alternatives available now, 
I propose to focus on the underlying concerns to contribute to a conceptual framework for Com 
considerations and address some of the questions that the Members of the Committee have 
raised. 
But As the Chair 
utili ties now 
this committee and the is to the merger. 
argue that it is a to excuse 
before 
merger I mean to a but the State the It's our 
fundamental unit of political authority. I believe its may be the 
institution in our society, the repository of the power to tax, to decide what is and what is not a 
criminal act, and to protect the citizenry from a variety of 
entities which have obtained a dispensation from the That power does 
seem to be limited somewhat by some 28 propositions, however. However, utilities are 
natural monopolies which, to quote the regulatory legal term of art, are "affected with the 
interest." They are given that most precious of 
necessity substantially without competition. 
Moreover, the owners of those utilities are 
- Zl-
an exclusive franchise to a 
as a matter of to a fair rate of return 
The first element of a 
this fact: Those stockholders 
structure for this Committee is the full 
to a which benefits 
market-related rate of return on their And 
cost expenses 
that 
made 
PUC disallowance of rate increases. those 
will determine that cost unless disallowed a 
And in the case of a momentous decision to such a disallowance is 
and may even be foreclosed if 
is w! act of 
decision to decline to 
that this Committee 
of these 
merger or rules are the FERC, as 
arrogance for a subject to such a 
before its state Legislature. I would 
to that declination considering the following 
the documents from the utilities relevant to 
variables we shall discuss and then not the 
officials 
who will not know the answers to 
the work papers and business but the middle-m 
utilities. 
I want to comment on two technical and 
affect the 
seem technical but they are 
very 
consideration. 
is I don't mean 
because for your policy 
these two issues with you because 
an instant cure for insomnia here but I want to 
do affect the framework. State regulatory 
have over the 
includes the 
at least in 
of the PUC Code 
retail power within their 
mergers or, for that matter, any 
we have that jurisdiction delineated in 
any 
of that section is very, very broad and 
acquisitions. Keep in mind, 
and does not, in any way, 
or disallowing a 
whatever. 42 USC, Section 7 
as Harris was concerning criteria to 
It simply hands the ball to the state PUC without any 
the federal level, vests authority in the Federal 
Commission to mergers and securities under the Federal Power Act 
Federal Power Act is limited and unclear where the lines are between this power 
to regulate mergers. I'm sure that that's going to be subject to litigation to come. 
issue is complicate,~ the 1968 Williams Act. That statute amended the 
and Exchange Act of '34 to for certain filing and disclosure requirements and is 
because in 1982 the Supreme Court decided Edgar v. Mite Corporation, interpreting the 
reach of the federal statute. In Edgar, Illinois had attempted to review a tender offer for a Chicago 
company with its state takeover review law. On a close vote, the Court held that the Illinois Act 
was an "indirect burden" on interstate commerce and struck the Illinois statutory review 
So you must know at the outset, what is the test for the balancing of interest under 
that criteria which will determine whether or not your state PUC or the FERC may well determine a 
- zz-
very 
statues 
merger review and merger 
to effectuate a legitimate local 
commerce are it will be 
excessive in relation to local benefits. 
a clause modified a modified 
seem 
another """"u.'""'• 
the test in Pike Church and a test which 1s very unclear at this 
Some commentators believe that state such as the 
mergers, will in an 
Transportation Law Journal of '86. I disagree. I think that a ''no" to a merger under Section 854 of 
the is very likely to withstand a federal preemption argument, 
However, given the water power features of many utilities 
possible purchases, it might be wise to fashion the PUC's in terms consistent with the 
balancing tests extant. And that would require amendments to Section 854 and you better start 
thinking about it because you may have no PUC jurisdiction if Mr. Berger, Professor 
substantiated by the courts. 
In addition to the basic jurisdictional issue of merger a less-discussed 
conflict the basic power to set rates. And you better understand this too because this 
to be very important. Now the FERC jurisdiction, federal is established 
ratesetting for the wholesale transfer of power. Wholesale becomes much more 
as the utility structure grows in size and complexity. A structure a 
company, or perhaps a number of holding companies, will be 
When it does this, it operates wholesale. Only the final sale to the power 
:retail. When it the FERC can a fair the 
for the power. 
What if the state PUC that 
uu.~.~::,,cu.c is excessive? Can disallow the costs? The 
on June 24 of this year indicates the a 
costs company to 
the retail pay costs as 
of the state commission. 
The case indicates two federal be not 
merger but is :rather certain to be after it. To the extent 
transfer power even entities 
on the 
entities 
sales through successive m them may subsume :rate 
at the federal level. Where the FERC declares the of power power 
company X to Y is their and the customers of Y must pay it as 
is unclear what is left for the state agency to do. 
The solution here is, once to amend your to to 
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the PUC to intervene in all FERC 
we should be 
on the 
which sounded like it was the 
or 
tests 
No adverse 
Now which 
The federal 
and we have a representative here to 
left -- case back in 
does not connote a benefit to 
consistent with the public 
derived or the idea of a promotion of the 
interest ..• one the federal as 
& appears to be rather easy, no of test of Connecticut, 
grave concern, or should be of grave concern, to us here in California. 
to turn to the theoretical and -- and going to disagree 
comments that 
to 
is 
been 
with Mr. 
so far. 
a Power utilities are natural 
has many advantages and 
extent there is a mix of natural and competition, 
because there are enhanced, additional abuse as 
I want to talk about the theoretical advantages of a merger 
lower 
rests on some 
and what's been 
of scale or traffic 
to consider that many utilities exhibit diseconomies of 
certain thresholds and many are well that done our own studies of 
in the rate that have been on, regression studies, and we've 
And a consensus that there is no overall economy of 
now in terms of that Inherent economies of scale which may attend 
traffic across the same fixed cost structure are unlikely in a merger where 
territories are hooked 
Now it is that one company structure will have assets of particular use to 
and a synergy or there could be a traffic sharing, as is often claimed 
these mergers. But counter-consideration alluded to by Mr. Rosso and 
want to make it as clear as I can. The sale or lease of a11 asset by one partner with the other could 
be contract in an marketplace setting. It's perhaps more likely 
that the merger will create a captive market for the interchange, foreclosing the full range of 
as the "partner" is favored; that the use of the excess assets or power of merged entity 
go to Y automatically if X and Y merge. But if they are separate, Y might search a wider 
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and obtain that asset or power from source Z at a better for its 
The second possible advantage is the acquisition of a more diverse base 
of also mentioned Mr. and 
of a different combination of assets to 
This rather unusual benefit-- and it is unusual-- may well be 
merger if the extremely low-cost Hoover Dam and other sources of power available 
which may be made available to SDG&E at lower rates as SDG&E's more 
assets are if can be. 
A third may be quite simple -- a change of management -- the 
managers don't parachute out at a price making their presence a bargain. I have 
more direct approach to management failure. I strongly believe PUCs should 
advocated a 
what the 
market does as much as possible. What does the market do when management creates 
twice the cost level of competitors? Theoretically, before it goes out of business, its stockholders 
notice dividend sinking; through its Board of Directors, they fire management; they bring in a new 
team. I would argue that management of a natural monopoly without the inconvenience of 
competition and at rates of pay more than ten times we offer our legislators should not be viewed as 
a lifetime sinecure. It should be viewed as a precious opportunity totally dependent on 
performance. Failure to meet performance guidelines for cost reductions and 
improvement should result in PUC rate increase grants conditioned upon a in upper 
management. No PUC has ever used this obvious remedy and this committee should consider 
legislation to introduce it. That option would be preferable to management change the 
of a merger process. 
Now that I've listened to the advantages, although with some I'd like to 
address the dangers. 
The first is the natural outcome of any of economic or power. And a 
merger involves Lord famous dictum 
is more than a .__ .. ,.'-... ''"' 
is a necessary evil. 
it underlies our of balances -- checks. 
a natural 
of its natural and from any 
American 
smaller is 
that qua is not better. all other 
local is better. A second and related disadvantage to may be the enhanced 
to extend the monopoly structure into the competitive sector or to forces 
and technological process {sic) from challenging the sunk cost natural investment structure. 
The facts of the AT&T case illustrate the consequences of such enhanced powers a 
natural monopoly. It can take many forms -- refusal to cross 
The second general disadvantage is the loss of a yardstick, that is, the regulator does not have 
another separately accounted 
performance of the natural 
natural monopoly in a different 
with cost and rate base measurement to compare with the 
I think more sets of decision makers, even where each has a 
has for the Not only does the 
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of but there is 
and reduce costs. 
a..'1.other team to 
Yes. 
ROSENTHAL: -- conclude? 
FELLMETH: 
a merger occurs, 
sector or natural 
mergers have 
the standard used 
carry 
the State New 
pose for state 
and a or area of 
examine a contract between two 
of 
as I've where a firm 
ect to other jurisdictions, there's a 
the transactions that occur. We have also 
as the mergers grow, become more 
for very unusual reasons. 
adverse consequences for the The 
to under a standard of proof, 
There are two of benefit which must be the focus of that showing-- efficiency and 
vague to lower 
terms of traffic 
about a merger in and of 
"'"'JI..W.u. have 
and with the 
but demonstrable facts showing enhanced efficiency and 
and fixed-cost utilization. Since there is nothing intrinsically 
and are intrinsic of momentous consequence, 
must be based on facts and numbers with a proactive 
of interveners for the competitive sector and for 
interests. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
ROSENTHAL: 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN CATHIE WRIGHT: I know if a that you can directly 
m the four of you can address. I know how you want to handle it. But I've been 
to this on back and forth. And what I see could possibly happen, when 
"''j'"'•u15 about mergers1 for you could end up with only two utility companies in the 
of California-- the north and a south. And then my concern would be, you know, we've put so 
vua"J"" in the on 
of energy. And you 
forms of energy and also even on the point of independent 
that whole together, it seems to me as though we'd be destroying 
And is that one of the thrusts of the idea of a merger is to eliminate all 
the smaller competition? Because I know you mentioned-- the Professor mentioned "wheeling". Of 
course, 
som 
then brings in your producers. I'm just wondering if there's -- if there's 
else in the background besides just the fact the economy of scale and such. 
PROFESSOR FELLMETH: Well, there's going to be an terms 
the extent if you have a mix of you're going to have 
and of and so 
under some kind 
could still 
rational at>d careful 
But there are some I in run different 
to allow you to measure different schemes and different formats of for 
kinds of It you the kind of and of decision m 
which I which I think affirms the value of local control and 
MR. ROSSO: Well, I guess I think that it may or may not be a 
in the State of California. It really depends on whether 
consumers and the economy and the shareholders of those, of the 
to have two 
benefit of the 
And I as the 
Professor said, I don't think it would necessarily foreclose IPPs, industrial -- power 
producers or cogenerators. In fact, it would really depend on the extent to which the utilities would 
be interested in building additional generation or in buying additional generation. And so I don't think 
it would be either necessarily bad nor necessarily good. It just depends. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Any further questions? Thank you very much. Oh, yes. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: Incidentally, we did try to introduce a resolution, 
Congress to overturn that decision. And you know what they do with those resolutions, but we did 
take a look at it. 
If you were rewriting 854, you were amending 854, what would you put in it? 
PROFESSOR FELLMETH: Well, what I would do is I would, I would really follow an 
Harris' advice or suggestion and I would list some of the criteria. First of all, I would in a 
specific burden that requires the proponent to affirmatively justify the merger, which is not there at 
Secondly, I require that the merger demonstrate enhanced in terms of use 
of the the -- and investment of the and that be an 
affirm 
the fixed 
factually based demonstration that must be made. I want to see increased utilization 
or enhanced traffic distribution or enhanced asset use and I would 
;.;c:.ucu out in the statute. 
see those 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: All Thank you very Now the final one in this 
Edward Director of Governmental Affairs, Pacific Power & Company. And in your 
would you highlight the issues that have been raised Federal 
Commission, FERC, your merger proposal. 
MR. EDWARD GROSSWILER: Thank you, Mr. 
like to do that in response to questions, if I 
adequate--
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you. 
MR. GROSSWILER: -- time for those 
We the to here 
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Members of the Committee. I would 
and my remarks are brief so there'd be 
about our merger, tah Power & 
could do I not be here. 
your 
refers to us, a 
counties. We also sell 
state. 
to merge. And since then the 
the seven where we have the merger, arily on 
state. At this as Rosso has the 
Commission action. I can tell you that they do it 
We'll check this We do remain about approval at FERC. 
The merger from 
a more 
is 
energy services 
the fact that one-third 
vuJ:;v•.n):; effort to reshape the company for 
Just how competitive that marketplace 
commercial and industrial sales volume be demonstrated 
is threatened loss to onsi te cogeneration in the industrial and 
power sector. Another one-third or 700 average megawatts of primarily 
threatened loss to other not really familiar with the 
of natural 
at threat from 
several years, has 
but I would that with one-third of our resources 
no longer be defined as a natural monopoly. 
over the last four years, 
reduced our workforce, for example, by 
and attempting to enhance service by 
we wrote off several years ago hundreds of millions in For 
investments without recovery from our customers because we felt a commitment to 
stable and was an for several years. For three 
committed to 
are for :rate decreases 
And while we do have rate cases pending in 
I guess, is an indication of rate cases go on 
in the 
new circumstances 
commissions and the FERC have 
govern the 
To recent merger and 
technology, and the 
have underscored the immediate necessity of facing the 
The are responding 
and advances. Several state energy 
implementing new policies and exploring new rules 
in proper context, it is important to understand 
regulatory response have changed the fundamental 
character of the industry. For as never before, choices now exist. For utilities, 
has replaced the tradi tiona! assurance of rate-of-return regulation. 
customers can now select among a variety of utility and non-utility suppliers, other fuel 
sources, and energy service providers. They want, and are willing to pay for, differing levels of 
or in their service. No longer the sole suppliers of electric power, utilities have 
their load demands lose smaller scale generation technologies, improved 
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measures, and regulatory change have increased competition for customer 
At the same time, because not all customers have the to choose among energy 
service must continue responding to the core residential 
When marketplace customers leave their utility's systems, cost consequences exist 
customers who remain and bear an increased burden for the utility's fixed costs. Because 
been sensitive to this situation, our price stability commitment, which in all states, 
core customers as well as to marketplace customers. 
In an environment characterized by uncertainty, traditional to assuring 
for those 
has 
supplies of power are being re-examined. Sources of alternative supply are sought in of 
constructing large generation plants. "Off-system" power is playing an increasing role in 
customers' needs. Price and meeting customers' needs have become primary concerns of Pacific 
Power. 
To compete, utilities must be able to offer customers what they need and want; otherwise, they 
face the unprecedented risk of losing customers and having to increase prices for those customers 
remaining after other customers with choices leave the system. In order to offer customers what 
they need and want, utilities must have available a flexible array of supply and service options. 
We think the merger with Utah Power & Light will do that. It will benefit California customers 
and, in fact, all Pacific customers, through long-term price stability and a more efficient of 
energy service. California customers have received a firm commitment over the next five years to 
no overall price increases. It's flat, no overall price increases, no increases because of inflation or 
fuel adjustment, no price increase. California utilities will also benefit because the wheeling 
proposed as part of the merger assures all utilities non-firm and firm access into and 
company's system on an equitable basis. 
the 
The merged companies represent an extraordinary strategic and geographic fit. And a point 
that I think was addressed earlier is particularly important to this merger. is a winter-
company and UP&L in summer, their air load. Two can 
economic consolidate and reduce their reserve 
The are better 
the energy services This is characterized 
suppliers of all of energy services. 
The merger will have positive impacts on both operating costs. It will to 
substantial savings in net power costs. It will enable us to be more efficient in 
resources and to make additional wholesale sales at enhanced sales In it will 
permit savings in such areas as data inventories; legal -- I like that 
part; the next part I don't like -- government affairs, shareholder relations, and power 
maintenance schedule. 
The merger will enhance and 
need for new power supplies. These positive 
efficiencies. It will 
will make 
reduce the 
substantial benefits to 
FERC or any other of FERC. 
Mr. Harris. 
HARRIS: have one You to customers in terms 
et cetera. But seems to me, customers 
not residential customers. I know been a lot of competition 
their own facility, their small facilities. I don't know that 
Could you that? 
GROSS WILER: The residential in our service territory have -- we 
from a 
ents. In Northern C 
of our customers use wood as their 
the more urban areas. But Pacific is 
especially in terms of the 
and in Southern Oregon, more than 
source. This is obviously not possible 
a company that serves rural areas. So in addition to 
have the natural gas 
the state of the 
•u•~•'-''-uu~:::. small commercial 
is such that today, as we speak, the commercial 
are able to go to other sources. In addition, in 
of our service we do have state laws which permit the formation of public power 
on a basis. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: 
and ask that the next 
forward. The 
Commissioner of Peter 
I want to thank the panelists for their input 
with state and local regulatory issues, members, 
San Diego, Maureen O'Connor; Mitch Wilk, Mr. Wilk, 
Office of General Counsel of PUC; Robert Mussetter, 
of and Michael Assistant to Attorney 
California of Justice. 
of the of San Thank you for making it possible for us to 
here. 
MAYOR MAUREEN You're welcome, sir. 
CHAL.~MAN ROSENTHAL: ••• to the football team that I saw yesterday. 
MAYOR O'CONNOR: as you well know, sir, all mayors are not perfect and they can't 
like wish could 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Welcome. 
MAYOR O'CONNOR: rhank you, Mr. Rosenthal, Ms. Moore. Good morning. For those of you 
do not Maureen O'Connor, the Mayor of San Diego. 
I'd like to welcome you to San And second, I'd like to thank you for allowing me to 
this morning instead of this afternoon. I must preside over a council meeting and would have 
been if I'd not been able to testify before you. 
The merger mania that has gripped this country since the early 1980s has produced, in my 
any number of dangerous undercurrents for our economy. 
it has lessened, not increased, competition. Second, it has increased, not decreased, the 
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mountain of debt to out one's competitor. And it reduced the 
needed for reindustrialization or modernization of 
an entire of the so-called 
More as merger ania affects San 
are the seventh in the nation but are in 
San Diego Gas & which is in a hostile takeover battle with Southern c 
Such a takeover would not make us the 
but will also us of any local on and rates In 
addition, San Diego stands to lose at least 1 
I'm not defending San Diego Gas & Electric. In fact, I have fought with the utility on more than 
one occasion. But I am defending San Diego's right to have its own in its own town and to 
with it as often as we wish to. As Southern California Edison manages to 
San Diego Gas & Electric, who among us will have ready access to the new Los based 
executives? Who among us will be able to ask for support for our local charities and expect any 
term help from a Los Angeles based company? And who among us believes for a minute that a 
erger will in any way reduce the ratepayers' bills in the are 
highest of any utility in the country. I can only speak as the Mayor of a very 
that strongly opposes the intrusion of a Los Angeles based utility into a town 
the second 
and wonderful 
a potential hostile 
takeover and the guarantee, in my opinion, of higher rates for all of our residents and 
commercial users. I have to believe there's a better way to do business than for a San 
to be once again swallowed up by a Los Angeles conglomerate. 
company 
Thank you very much for me out of order, and oy your in San Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you. of the Mayor? Yes. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: a devil's advocate. You know 
MAYOR time. 
MOORE: All the time. 
WRIGHT: my, shall I say, in the to be the 
advocate. But should San be different than any other in the 
tate of California? I mean come from a and 
that with utilities or none of them 
are based in Simi we dealt with Los And I say that we love Los 
because we don't, but, you know, what, -- would make it that San Diego, as far as this 
particular utility would be necessary that it be based here and why not in Los 
say, a district office in San 
MAYOR we have a company based in San now. 
I don't know if that was the case when you were mayor of your and I know the size of the 
that you were mayor of •. I can almost be assured that it's a lot smaller than the second 
largest city in the State of California. I think the second 
deserves to have its own in Sa..'! 
1 -
in the State of California 
have to tell you that a lot of the 
&: Electric 
that we can 
And 
district 
customers I 
and am one of were not cu,,., .... "''L' but we like to 
I mean we've had a lot of power over the last 
to go to Los to the local here to solve them is 
located in Sa..• in not the 
as of San I don't see any real 
see any benefit see any benefit as the service to our 
I don't see any benefit to the because in the long-run, and this is 
how to be able to do it for less. Maybe in the short-
in the no. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Frazee. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRAZEE: 
based on the fact that the franchise 
is not an additional concern of the City of San 
that SDG&:E has with the City of San Diego is 
much more beneficial than is Southern California Edison's agreement with cities within their 
And I believe that's the case. And obviously, if there were to be an acquisition, I don't 
that there would be an allowance for a significantly higher franchise fee in San Diego 
the rest of the service of a Southern California Edison. And then that loss of 
to the City of San Diego would have to be made up by the taxpayers in some other form or in 
of services. 
MAYOR 
have to say that that could be correct. And also in our charter states that the Mayor and 
are the ones that are to be having this hearing and will be the ones who decide 
we will agree to the shift of the franchise. But it just seems to me, if what you 
and I have any reason to believe that not-- should we take less? But 
what we're about here. We are about keeping it locally based. I mean, see, I don't 
we have our own company. We're fine here now. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRAZEE: is fine but I think the real concern is for the taxpayer, the 
rates and then taxes and services received for those taxes. 
MAYOR There's no The ratepayer is the ultimate person that we have 
San 
worried about. And I have not been convinced in everything I've read that our ratepayer is 
to better off. And I saw some of the -- a.•d I don't know if this is true -- what they're 
but I don't think our employees are going to be better off if these practices come 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRAZEE: Thank you. 
MAYOR O'CONNOR: Any other questions? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: All right. Thank you very much. 
MAYOR O'CONNOR: All right. Thank you very much. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Our next member we will hear from is Mitchell Wilk who is a 
missioner on the PUC. And let me just mention that, because of the time frame, I'd like to limit 
each of the panelists ten minutes. And when we get to nine minutes, I will let you know. So instead 
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of reading-- and I have a number of presentations -- but you couldn't 
and so you're going to have to summarize a little bit for us. Thank you. 
this in 20 minutes 
COMMISSIONER G. MITCHELL WILK: Thank you, Mr. Chairm 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Mr. Wilk. 
COMMISSIONER WILK: Members of the Com Madam President 
(Laughter) 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: What'd he say? 
COMMISSIONER WILK: I will be much briefer than-- is this on? okay. I will be much 
briefer than the ten minutes, Mr. Chairman. I have just written out a few points that I want to make 
because I think, frankly, the value here today is to ask questions and to see what kind of responses we 
can 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: And I understand that you have to leave so you have to do that. 
COMMISSIONER WILK: Well, I will certainly stay the length of the panel, Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you. 
COMMISSIONER WILK: It's my pleasure to do so and I'm glad to be here. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Mr. Chairman, just one question. Is there something wrong with 
Mr. Wilk? 
COMMISSIONER WILK: I was about to make the same •.• 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: He seems to be alone. Everybody else went back there. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Because the Mayor was going to be sitting there but she decided to 
stand. 
COMMISSIONER WILK: No, that's okay. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: You may do so if ... 
COMMISSIONER WILK: I always sit by myself, Senator. Sometimes it's safer that way. It's 
also an easier shot. 
I have probably as many 
many of you know, the or issue 
Edison. And we even have a 
we have as many as you do. 
taken some action that I think 
as all of you do about the issues that are before us As 
of course, is are the proposals with SDG&E and 
from SDG&E So as a 
in case not aware of the PUC has 
our initial concern over these issues. It was my 
commissioner's ruling a week ago to a variety of parties, including the City of San Diego and UCAN 
and others, asking a series of very hard-hitting questions about the issue of the activities of the 
Edison Holding Company in its purchase of a thousand shares of stock; another question having to do 
with the conduct of one of its officers in the of and several other having to 
do with the adequacy of the existing PUC Code and how we ca11 assure ourselves on the commission 
that both the conduct of the parties, as well as the outcome of this, will be in the ratepayers' best 
interests. And for those of you that have not received a copy of that I will make sure that you 
have one. 
So we are, in fact, already taking action. I think the two relevant questions today regarding the 
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Commission are What are the criteria we will use to these 
what is the process we will use to consider them? So let m 
criteria that I believe this commission will be to evaluate these 
I think I need to say the outset that these are ect to some 
new area for all of us and we are forward to the 
will be 
the second caveat is -- this is 
additional 
ladies and gentlemen. 
criteria in the Code and I would urge that we need to 
some very careful to that before you proceed because every merger and 
that strikes me is very different. Based upon my experience so far, we need to 
careful about how we start the criteria in the Code. 
the criteria that I, as the a.:.::u.~,uc:u and I think my fellow colleagues would 
in this case, first and foremost, a all classes -- residential, consumer, 
to be on all of these different ratepayer and yes, What is the 
of course, is considerations. 
obviously, it would be the cost to power, both in terms of its generation, its distribution, 
transmission. Diversity of supply and fuel mix, important. Operational costs and the 
cost structure of a m what is that to look like? Load balancing is obviously 
of concern. of We will not tolerate a diminished quality of our 
of m~.'"'""''"' ..... 
done? And, of course, the 
also very concerned about the 
Productive 
the management going to look like when it's all 
of service. These are all obviously directly related to the 
on And I mean just union or non-
are content and happy employees and we mean all 
need to resolution to these issues as soon as possible. I have been a victim of holding 
and merger and I can tell you there's nothing worse on employee moral 
on local interests. I think heard a very concerned Mayor O'Connor this 
and I have to admit that I am with some of her concerns, although I 
to agree with about the issue of whether or not cities deserve to have 
because happen to be of a certain size. have to take a look at Oakland and San 
big cities. The of course, served by PG&E. 
impact on the state economy and the utility infrastructure of this state. We can't 
the fact that all of this fits together into the California and that in terms of its attractiveness 
to live, work, and invest. We need to pay very careful attention to the quality of these 
and what they bring to the infrastructure of the State of California and the utility 
infrastructure. 
impact on the financial strength and the viability of the combined entity. Is this going 
be or are they going to use all their resources in the purchase of a utility and find 
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themselves in financial trouble? We 
closely at that. 
are very concerned about that and we'll 
on We share the concern, been outlined 
A General's Office. not the only ones that are antitrust and 
We look forward to the very active involvement of the General's Office 
make certain that we 
served. 
have antitrust and that the interests of 
So those are the criteria as I see them at this ladies and In the 
final analysis, the criteria we is no more than the process we use. 
understand Pete Arth from the staff will be discussing that process with you. it's to 
be open and deliberative. We're not going to rush the judgment. And we want to have the benefit of 
as many parties as possible. These are new areas. We want to take the time 
explore them and at the same time reach a conclusion that does not create the kind of of 
that frankly, obviously, exist today in San Diego in particular. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you. It's my understanding, Wilk, that San Diego rates are 
declining and Edison rates are rising and that by next year Edison rates may exceed those with 
At the same time, Edison has promised to lower San Diego rates 10 if a merger 
If that's exactly what appears to you to be the case, can you ensure that Southern 
California Edison ratepayers are not forced to subsidize San Diego as of a merger 
deal? 
COMMISSIONER WILK: You bet. I don't think that's-,- first of all, let me say that I agree with 
assessment as to the direction of the different rates. It is clear that within a year, at the 
earliest, possibly, perhaps two years, the rates will cross and I think that adds an different 
dimension to these issues. And there is --I can't imagine this commission a mandated rate 
reduction for San Diego on the backs of Edison ratepayers. That, as far as I'm 
that would be that we would, we would have some 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Just as a to could you condition a merger upon 
shareholders to pay for that rate reduction? 
COMMISSIONER WILK: as understand where the to come 
in any it's the shareholder money, This is not money. And where 
the stock differential and others. This is not -- if Mr. Allen wants to reduce rates for 
San have to do it in a way balanced doesn't come on the backs of 
But the money that is being used to finance all of the component parts of the 
as I understand it -- and again, Mr. Chairman, I don't have their This is based 
upon what read in the newspapers, as much as what you've read in the newspapers. 
understanding is that those funds are coming from the shareholder. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: You've touched upon, and I'd like to just follow up on my concern 
about the manner in which Edison used its holding company and affiliate to pursue its acquisition--
COMMISSIONER WILK: sir. 
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San What does the PUC have to deal with 
..... .,,,.u.'"' in our statement. In 
read you the relev~~t of the 
go ahead and ... Let me 
Excuse me. Does 
have a written statement that's been 
COMMISSIONER the is I wrote some notes and 
I can w:ri te those notes up like. 
no, you had a written statement that you were 
ROSENTHAL: He wrote them out this 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: written this morning, right? 
deal of and to the preceding 
to do this. 
does SCE 
from the Public Utilities Code 
under decision 8801-063, 
or case law have fewer restrictions than Edison 
merger with Edison. If so, in what Does the mode of 
structure of the affect the answer? If so, how? 
in the process a public utility must the acquiring 
for commission authorization under PU Code 854? What 
commission have 
2 11 and ZllZ or other enforcement 
make sure that all of these to you, 
corporations or persons 
of the Public Utility Act? 
but we are asking the very same 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: And I have one other question before I turn it over to 
_...:..._ ____ _,__ 
. I'd like to ask some 
I'm assuming that there are substantial costs being incurred as these various utilities pursue 
merger In if there's a hostile takeover, legal and other costs could be 
For example, we already know that the Edison deal would require a payment of $25 
million to Tucson. Who pays for these costs? Ratepayers or shareholders? 
COMMISSIONER WILK: Well, if SDG&E has to pay a $2.5 million penalty to Tucson Electric, I 
would oppose any ratepayer impact, any ratepayer payment of that. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you. Assemblywoman Killea. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN LUCY KILLEA: I have a question. Since you were here for the earlier 
discussions -- see, you are surrounded. You may be out there by yourself. (Laughter) 
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COMMISSIONER WILK: I don't even have a wall to back against here. 
that there e ASSEMBLYWOMAN KILLEA: One of the opinions was 
about whether or not the PUC ultimately will have because based on certain 
other cases that have been presented. Do you have any comment on that? 
COMMISSIONER WILK: Well, of course, lawyers will disagree. I'm not a lawyer. But I am very 
confident, Mrs. Killea, that the PUC -- first, let me tell you that, contrary to the impression you 
might have gotten this morning, earlier, is that we are very active participants before FERC, 
the FCC, and other federal agencies constantly fighting for our state jurisdiction. And frankly, we 
feel that we are in very good legal position to fight for that. And I don't fear, I don't fear that we're 
going to be preempted on something like this. But again, lawyers will disagree. I'm confident 
given the size and diversity of California, given our very open, deliberative process, I think that 
we have quite that level of fear. But again, lawyers can disagree. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Any further-- yes, Ms. Moore. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: A couple of questions. I listened with interest to your criteria 
that you set forth, or at least the issues that you indicated would come into consideration, and I 
concur. I also concur with you that probably California is on pretty safe ground in terms of 
jurisdiction that's afforded us under the Section 854 and otherwise because I do know how we have 
vigorously fought for our rights as a state. 
A couple of questions come to mind. You indicated in the issues that you raised that you would 
be looking in applying certain standards and you talk on one hand of no adverse effect to the utility 
and then on the other hand-- to the ratepayers-- and then on the other hand, you talk about a 
positive ratepayer benefit. It seems that those two are in conflict. Which would be the 
standard? 
COMMISSIONER WILK: Well, I think at the very minimum. I'm not sure that they're in 
conflict, Mrs. Moore. I think ••• 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I mean they take two different approaches, 
WILK: They do. I think, at a minimum, ratepayer indifference is the 
minimum standard. But frankly, we would like to see ratepayer impact because mergers and 
for tremendous for load for diversity of supply and fuel 
mix and other ~-···-.-.·~· 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I understand that. That's why I questioned •.• 
COMMISSIONER WILK: And so we're looking for ratepayer benefit. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: Okay. So then you're saying that then the standard will be a 
positive one--
COMMISSIONER WILK: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: -- of ratepayer benefit? 
COMMISSIONER WILK: Perhaps I could put it a slightly different way because some of the, 
some of the criteria I suggested, frankly, obviously ratepayer indifference would also apply but ..• 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: No. Let me see if I can keep you on my track. 
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there is a total different when talk 
this is all 
When you talk about a 
me that the standards for 
would sense to pursue. 
to hold you to this 
iv1itch. The other that you 
was one that you would not rush to decision. 
MMISSIONER WILK: correct. 
MOORE: Which is a different than the that the 
in in some of the other areas. What do you see as your time frame on this in 
talked about deliberate kind of process where people will have 
you And I assume that the Mayor of San and 
everyone else that wants to have some into this would 
What kind of time frame do you see this occurring? 
very to Mrs. Moore, at this point. Again, we 
from San But that we can get the 
are in we obviously -- it is our intention to either 
under the umbrella of a proceeding both the Edison and the Tucson 
about that at this point instead of other proposals, and that I 
we could reach decision for the of the who are very 
as to where their livelihood is to have a decision within six 
But I would think that that would be the earliest. 
MOORE: So you do see an process? 
I think a year -- see, I don't to think a year is expedited. 
but you said six which is 
MISSIONER WILK: Y six months would be the fastest track. And again, the 
world to Mrs. and I will also this tomorrow at our other 
is that we are not going to make a mistake on due process. That would be, that would be 
We are to make ::ertain that the who want to be heard are heard. It'll be a full, 
deliberative process. In as the 
we will hold hearings here in San 
views. 
as 
commissioner in the case, I have already agreed 
to make certain if we have full access to all the 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: You talk about -- there is due process and then there is due 
process. And, you know, coming to San Diego, holding a one-day hearing where people don't have 
much notification that it's to take place, and while it's extending the PUC's opportunity to 
serve the kind of purpose that hopefully you're attempting to get. And so I 
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that there'll be of notice and all those things before San do 
so too. It's 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: further •.• 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRAZEE: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: an Frazee. 
MOORE: Oh, one last -- and then I ask anymore. You indicated 
you felt that before we would start to take a look at 854 that we would take into consideration some 
The and issues that you raised are very broad based and would be 
of avenues that we would look to include in terms of setting forth some minimum 
the PUC would follow. The importance of such a statute -- and I would that 
Mr. Strumwasser, when he speaks, could speak to that, could also to this as him an 
attorney. It would seem to me that it would give us greater strength to have it in statute rather than 
just having the PUC by policy or practice to derive some activity. If it were part of the ongoing 
statute to mandate that certain criteria be followed would give us greater standing if we ended up in 
court battling over our jurisdictional rights. 
COMMISSIONER WILK: I don't quite know how to respond to that, Mrs. Moore, because I'm not 
a lawyer. But as a practical matter, I have to look at it as a regulator. And at this juncture, 
the diversity of the proposals that we're talking about, it is speaking for myself personally, it is very 
important for our commission to have fairly wide latitude in terms of the criteria we use because --
case case. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: Well, I think the criteria that you set forth was very •.• 
COMMISSIONER WILK: But they apply, they apply to, for example, electric mergers. 
you we've got, we have the merger. I mean have load "'-'-4'-'-'''-'·""" in the classic 
sense of the word. have -- so in other we have very And 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: but I think that some of the that you talked 
would not be necessary. C would 
what it looks the the ones 
basic criteria that are true in any merger, whether 
And I think there's some broad-based kind of 
of California that could be broadly discussed in that kind of criteria and 
there to it. 
I mean there are certain 
utili ties or the gas and 
on the 
the PUC would be 
COMMISSIONER WILK: Well, be available to work with you, Mrs. and 
your staff on that. My is that law is -- you the law unless you 
absolutely have to. And I would urge that we all very careful consideration before we 
into law that frankly have to be there. I think that the constitutional of 
this commission to protect the interests of is a very 
us our marching orders in every one of these insta.."lces and 
and one that 
us the kind of latitude we 
FRAZEE: You are. 
Thank you. 
some 
of 
you to 
to do that. 
understand yours 
think in the 
here in 
criteria ••• 
with you, Mrs. Moore. 
raised the issue of the 
and I was 
has not the PUC 
on that 
some in the 
effective with the 
of the concerns that we had in 
to subsidize our 
affiliates. 
c:ri te:ria that 
transactions between the 
about the 
concerned --
concern about whether 
transactions and the 
not sure if 
Tha.."lk you very much. 
COMMISSIONER Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: The next is Peter Arth, also the General Counsel of the 
who understand is to us some of the criteria as to process, in ten minutes or less. 
PETER AR TH: Thank you very much. name is Pete Arth and here mostly to give a 
perspective on both the criteria and the process that we will occur with the SDG&E 
options. As was mentioned this morning, it isn't a new in 
to the pension between the two major utilities. What you see 
to trucking companies and water companies. And indeed, that is the 
economies of scale have occurred and had merger and 
Section 854 in its 
where 
This obviously is different and in the interest of time, I would say from a criteria there are 
to be two major questions asked. For the given option, is this really in the best interest of the 
ratepayer? And I would amend for the DRA the best interest of the 
And secondly, and this is sort of where the rubber hits the road, how are we to assure, in the 
decision that deals with the option, that the benefits offered are in fact the benefits realized? And 
the track record that we have is limited in terms of major stationary monopoly-type utilities. 
The Commission recently approved the Pacific Power & Light UPL merger and what they did 
was, I think, a very encouraging sign. In making the traditional litany of benefits proposed, one of 
those was that the combined cost of operation would be lower than on a stand-alone basis with 
Pacific Power & Light in its rural California operations. The Commission said, "Fine. If that is, in 
the case, prove it." And the company acceded to a condition in the decision that says, as 
Mr. Grosswiler mentioned earlier, that they shall have no rate increases for their California 
operations for the next five years. But again, that was an easier decision because very small 
California impact-- and they had the diversity benefit that was a clear winner-- with the CP 
national application that was just recently filed, where they're going to merge or be purchased by 
Alltell, which is a Midwest telecommunication company. Again, this gets into some of the traditional 
items -- rural service by the acquiring entity, rural service by the present entity, better financial 
strength should be economies of scale. But then we start to get into the holding company issues. 
Now a California utility operation will be answering to a Midwestern larger concern and it's 
to be important to assure the performance by using the protections, some which will be in the 
decision, we hope, some which are a consequence of the legislation that is passed in the last several 
sessions that assures access to the books and records of the and annual reporting as to exactly 
going on to the extent there are cross subsidies between the entities to the extent that there 
are combined dealings. So this is where the support and the net start to come into 
With the SDG&E proceedings and the options of either nothing, the Tucson option, or the Edison 
option, there's basically going to be a one-two-three-type approach and in the interest of time, I'd 
adopt Mr. Rosso's sublist. I think it was a good list of concerns. But to look at the SDG&E 
as a stand-alone cost, expense, and see where the ent stand-alone 
versus combination, for the given combination to make sure that it is the best possible combination, 
do not limit it to what is actually before the Commission, in the application, but to see hypothetically 
looking at the contract options, looking at the resource options, is there a better way to go, and 
to improve what is being and finally, the and where the rest of 
the panel has come into play, to try to get before the Commission not only the strict economic issues 
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MOORE: and I think that, of course, 
about whether the size of the has anything to do with whether a 
the real question is the fact that you have one here that's been 
the has not been one that one would hold in high it 
this whole notion 
remains or not. I think 
And while its record in 
has turned around 
a number of the alternatives that I think one of the earlier describe that 
to be considered before you look at mergers and consolidation. And I think when you have 
utility that has moved down that path, I think some of those also have to be taken into 
consideration as the PUC looks at what they're going to do. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. Thank you very much. We'll move to our next panelist, 
Robert Mussetter, the Commissioner on the California Energy Commission, and an admonishment, ten 
minutes. 
COMMISSIONER WILK: Also take your sunglasses off, Bob. 
COMMISSIONER MUSSETTER: If I do that, I can't read. These views are mine alone and not 
necessarily those of the Energy Commission. The Energy Commission has taken no position on 
mergers today. However, most of the statements that I'll make are entirely consistent with 
other well-known positions that the CEC has taken, notably, its long-standing consistent position and 
support of a new interstate natural gas pipeline to serve the {inaudible) in Kern County and 
elsewhere in California and its ongoing effects of our efforts to assure power supplies from out 
state. 
California must open arteries that bring energy into California. We have arteries on the 
highways and the people are finding them and they're coming in here, as you all know. And without 
recognizing that overriding fact, I think this whole discussion is a little bit off kilter, myself. I think 
the who sat down here where Mr. Wilk is now, Mr. Rosso had as number 
on his list access to outside power sources. And I think that he doesn't understand 
how the California market As a matter of ladies and gentlemen, you must 
about consumer welfare inC that without the 
bulk power the rates that are in California would go at least 20 to 
30 as as that. And we need to these channels up. 
of course, interests want to close them down. very elementary. 
As was brought out, Senator Rosenthal was there, what, a week ago in Los Angeles at our Gas 
ent hearings. Virtually every speaker that the primary reason that another 
is needed is to promote shopping options to enable people, such as Edison, if you will, to 
have more options open to them in the acquisition of their energy supplies. In that case, it's gas but 
there's not a bit of difference between gas ru"'ld electric in this regard. So I tend to view these merger 
proposals as substitutes for transmission and then managem issues. 
I would take issue with the Mayor of San Diego, who I'm sure is making her statements with the 
best of intentions. But has she and considered the number of obs that be created in 
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We need to remember and I will agree with the Professor on that there is a 
issue here that you-- an Moore -- has been some 
about the of the FERC over the bulk power m is what amounts to. And I 
know how that's going to come out. I've got some staff papers here from some of our legal 
staff and they say essentially what you've been saying this morning, that it's a tangle, it's unclear, it's 
unresolved. But we face in California a much bigger and more adverse monopoly in the Bonneville 
Power administration than we do in any of the monopolies that we have in the state, at least in my 
judgment. And Bonneville is hard to deal with, not only because it's big, and has all of the power grid 
in the Northwest, it can block out the Canadians. But it's also awfully tough to deal with because it's 
a federal agency. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Mr. Mussetter, is the Energy Commission concerned that mergers 
may lock utilities into high-cost supplies and limit competition for cheaper alternatives? 
COMMISSIONER MUSSETTER: Just the reverse, Senator. In my opinion, the buying power and 
the routes to the cheaper sources would more likely-- and this is pre-analysis, you know. I mean 
we're talking out here without having a staff foundation, but I'll say it anyway, for sake of argument. 
If I were to guess today, I would guess that you're going to benefit both in San Diego and Los Angeles 
from an SCE San Diego merger because, for instance, you've got -- it could be very well that 
acquisition could make it possible to defer the Palo Verde Deever (?) application. Edison would 
shutter to hear me say that but it might be true. If they gained access to the power link, that might 
be just as good for the time being. And I would even say that it might be something to consider to go 
ahead and let the Tucson merger proceed, certainly listen to everything. And Mr. Wilk's agency is 
going to have to do all that. And then presuming that that does go through, then look at the Edison. 
And that might turn out that that's good too. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: If mergers lead to greater utility consolidation of transmission 
facilities, what do you think will be the impact on wheeling a<'ld competition? 
MUSSETTER: I don't think your premise is necessarily true. What we 
are in favor of is more transmission routes not all controlled the same into the markets 
of the state. It be, it's that if you had what I proposed, you could have that for a 
time But it takes to build these and do these I don't know that 
you're ever to -- no one's proposing to shut down the PUC. You're going to still regulate how 
much money they can make. 
What I'm about here, instead of having a bar chart this high, which has this much 
shareholder earnings in have one this high with this much shareholder earnings; you don't change 
anything there. The difference is what the ratepayer has to pay. That's gone down, you see. That's 
what you should be after. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: I think I have a right to respond. (Laughter) 
COMMISSIONER MUSSETTER: Since you were singled out. 
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ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I guess A home commuter-- a home computer-- is 
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..... u"'·"" that I feel like I need to to. But in the 
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your comments 
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time. He should sit down there with you. 
of come to mind. 
not I want to follow that along 
You were that she has not 
that would occur with the Edison merger. 
you meant that? 
we were fine. Do you remember that? 
MUSSETTER: 
years. 
MISSIONER MUSSETTER: yes. 
WOMAN MOORE: And 
COMMISSIONER MUSS 
before Before and after 
Um-hmm. 
COMMISSIONER MUSSETTER: All 
a fact Edison-- San --has had 
that be even lower than Edison next 
is fine. But what we're talking about 
What I'm saying is that it would be my expectation 
see lower rates in San after the merger which you would not be able to see prior to 
MOORE: But that has nothing to do with the merger and that's what we're 
talking about. Further, you indicated the creation of jobs and that's what my question was. 
COMMISSIONER MUSSETTER: Well, from the lower rates flow jobs because energy so 
in the economy. That's the very thing that the two utilities are over at their ... 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN And so into one of that 
businesses not such rates therefore can create more more 
business would be-- one of those kind of numbers? 
COMMISSIONER MUSSETTER: but •.. 
MOORE: The trickle-down theory? Is that •.• 
COMMISSIONER MUSSETTER: No, I don't think it's trickle down. I just think it's old 
economics. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: Well, I mean that's •.. 
COMMISSIONER MUSSETTER: If you're going to run a business ... 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I won't say voodoo, but I ... 
COMMISSIONER MUSSETTER: Your costs are important if you're going to run a business. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: No, but I just really wanted to, you know, kind of pursue that a 
little bit because the whole idea of merger are efficiencies and all these other kinds of things that 
generally follow along the lines of the concerns that the, and I must say, quite valid concerns that I 
believe the Mayor raised and I think, that, you know, that sometimes, we, you know, this case, this 
whole trickle-down kind of philosophy is substituted for what we know to be the very sound kinds of 
things that we can see, that we can see right away. 
COMMISSIONER MUSSETTER: Such as what? 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: You also talked about, a couple of your projections on the 
energy. And you talked about the pipeline hearing in Los Angeles and that, with this kind of 
that Edison would not, was not dependent on-- I forgot, I can't remember exactly what you said. But 
I guess the point that I want to make is: Don't you believe that Edison pretty much has a monopoly on 
the bulk transmission as with or without the merger with San Diego? 
COMMISSIONER MUSSETTER: Edison has a hold on the transmission situation. But those 
if you examine who owns them, Edison own them all. San Diego owns some of L.A. 
ent of Water: & Power owns some of and ... 
MOORE: I go into But still the transmission is the 
what we're about. 
COMMISSIONER MUSS ETTER: Well, but that's to answer your question. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: But part of the thing-- no. My question really goes to, 
ultimately, who's going to be the producer and that kind of But I guess the other question that 
I :really have, and I guess it's one that I should have asked Mitchell it's one that, with the 
emphasis on being on the and all ou:r questions have pretty much focused on that, 
what really happens to the gas side of the house under a merger and how do you handle that in your 
deliberations on the acquisition? 
COMMISSIONER WILK: Who are you a.<>J'-Hl.~ Bob or •.. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I guess interest is in, at least as the 
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COMMISSIONER MUSSETTER: What's to the gas is that your question? 
ASSEMBLY MOORE: Uh-huh. What do you see as a result of ..• 
COMMISSIONER MUSSETTER: I don't know to to it. That's up to Edison to 
if it that far. 
M sure up Edison. I think the gas side continues to thrive. 
think that we have ... 
guess my was: How do you that into your equation 
I mean gas and electric compete with 
from the gas company and competing for new 
will continue. And I'm 
the fact of a merger 
a company that does one. 
be taken into consideration. And my 
that 
creates an imbalance in that competition 
one company that does both. You've got it 
And I think that, as you consider that merger, that 
was really: How do you plan to look at that and 
how do you to balance out whatever concerns arrive from that kind of thing? 
COMMISSIONER WILK: as I the gas -- Bob , correct me if I'm wrong -- but 
as understand the gas the San Gas & Electric its gas from SoCal. I don't see 
that to ~~·~·""~ as a result of the merger. But again, we don't have a proposal in front of 
us ... 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: You talked about competition--
COMMISSIONER WILK: 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: -- between gas and electric. 
COMMISSIONER WILK: 
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ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: Does that mean, that if you've 
over that there may be some movement or some shift towards the gas company, gas 
oved to a variety of things? 
COMMISSIONER MUSSETTER: Well, I think it offers the potential, at of bringing some 
competition into the Southern California gas picture. That's what you're really looking at here. I 
welcome the idea of Edison getting into the gas business because I think SoCal needs the competition. 
we haven't even talked about SoCal this morning. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: Well, okay. Fine. So that's going to be one of your 
Mr. Wilk, that, as he indicated, that it would be --
COMMISSIONER WILK: Yeah, I mean •.• 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: -- a standard of getting into the competition in the gas ••• 
COMMISSIONER WILK: I'm afraid we may be overstating the impact if Edison gets involved by 
purchasing SDG&E that suddenly it finds itself in the gas business. It's still dependent upon Southern 
California Gas Company. I would urge you not to overstate the impact. I mean in some respects, I 
think Bob's absolutely right, to the extent that they are able to .•. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I'm not overstating it. I'm asking you what you plan to do about 
it in terms of looking at it. So what you're telling me, that my concern is unfounded and that you 
won't even look at that because there's no reason to. 
COMMISSIONER WILK: Mrs. Moore, I don't say I won't even look at it. I mean the fact is, 
we're going to look at the competitive aspects of this merger, and it's not just limited to electricity. 
It's the whole -- as I indicated when I listed the criteria earlier, we're .•• 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: So you're only interested in the gas side. The house would be the 
competition aspect? 
COMMISSIONER WILK: I think that goes to the heart of your concern, yes. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: No, but okay. I want to know what you're going to ... 
COMMISSIONER WILK: I'm sorry. Maybe we can discuss it later, Mrs. Moore, and we'll 
certainly pursue it. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Let's move on. And the final member of this panel, Michael 
Strumwasser, Assistant to the Attorney General. 
MR. MICHAEL J. STRUMWASSER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Caution. 
MR. STRUMW ASSER: Caution understood. You have my scholastic rendition. I wouldn't dare 
to provide you a live performance of that. 
Let me say, first of all, that Attorney General Van de Kamp shares the concerns the Committee 
has already expressed about the merger trends in the economy generally and in this industry in 
particular and has been active in trying to fill the void that's been left by laxed merger enforcement 
at the federal level. Let me also repeat the caveat that appears in my written remarks, and, that is, 
that this is a very complicated question. I'm sure, at this hour, nobody doubts that and that we have 
not done antitrust analysis necessary to conclude whether or not the antitrust laws would be violated 
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CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: What tools are available to the General to unfair 
the recent the Court decision? 
MR. STRUMWASSER: In the Texaco case? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yeah. 
MR. STRUMWASSER: one less than there was a week ago. We had 
Supreme Court that the California Antitrust Law, the C Act, to mergers and the 
Supreme Court ruled last week 4-3 that we were correct in that assumption and that we will be 
seeing many of the same faces when Attorney General Van de Kamp seeks for immediate 
on that. But there is certainly the Clayton Act which is less robust, frankly, in California than it is 
elsewhere because of a conflict among the various federal circuits about to enforce and how to 
interpret the Clayton Act. There is certainly the antitrust, the obligation of both if it hears 
the matter, and the PUC to consider and give substantial weight to any antitrust concerns that are 
brought before it and the Attorney General is following the PUC proceedings with and may 
well become involved with those. So both in the regulatory realm and, I think, eventually in the 
judicial realm, if that became necessary, there would be remedies available. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Any further questions? Thank you very much, panelists. We will 
now break for lunch. We will be back here and I will pound the gavel at 1:30, which we will have then 
the afternoon panel of various interest groups. Thank you very much. 
--LUNCH--
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Can you hear me now? No? One, two, three. Okay. Let me 
mention again that we will close the hearing with an open-microphone session to take brief comments 
from persons whose views were not represented by the panelists. Those wishing to speak at the open-
microphone session should place their name on the sign-up sheet which is available from the 
Committee Sergeant there at the front. 
At this point, like to alert each witness for our I urge each witness to 
limit his or her remarks to no more than ten and two minutes before that time is up, I will 
caution you so that we can get the entire u.""'",wu.u.. 
We now have Panel 3 with persons-- the on Various Interest groups. Do we have six 
members here? see. Brian Michael Shames, Steven Burton, William David 
and Bill Nelson. All We will 
First one will be Brian Bilbray, First District -- oh, he's not here. Next will be William 
Shaffran, Deputy City Attorney of San Diego. 
MR. WILLIAM SHAFFRAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Is this on? Is this on now? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes. 
MR. SHAFFRAN: Thank you. The San Diego Attorney's Office appreciates this 
opportunity to address this committee on the subject of U 
has regarding utility mergers, specifically mergers 
Company. 
The City of San Diego has two or concerns with the 
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MR. SHAFFRAN: Thank you. About the TEP merger, Tucson Electric there are two 
that concern me abou One loss of extensive control to the Federal 
and that scares 
with FERC. 
the issue of acid rain. care who becomes 
acid rain. Tucson Electric has all these nice coal-fired 
taken and have to convert or in these 
horrendous. Thank you. 
agree with the CPUC, but I never 
is to have to 
But if in fact acid rain is 
scrubbers and so on, the cost is 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. Let me-- do you believe then that the City 
franchise and charter give the power to disapprove a measure even if the PUC approves them? 
MR. SHAFFRAN: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I lost the members of the committee. show 
up. Brian Bilbray, Board of Supervisors, First District. 
MR. BRIAN BILBRAY: Mr. Chairman, first of all, I'd like to welcome you to the County of 
San Diego and to our chambers. I appreciate you being able to utilize our facilities here. We 
do appreciate your taking the time to come down and hear about the concerns and the interest of the 
people who live in the Southwest corner of this state where California I would like to 
out to you that I represent the First District of the County of San Diego which tends to be an area 
that has a large concentration of low- and moderate-income people. So my interest in this 
from a constituent's point of view, may be less to the stockholders and much more to the ratepayers. 
My constituents tend to get -- pay the rates more than receive the benefits of owning stock and that 
may reflect in my testimony today. The Board of Supervisors has come out in opposition to the 
merger with Edison, basically on the contention that it would be bad for the ratepayers of this region 
and that the long-term impacts on the region do not justify the activity. 
First of all, let me stress, with that point, we're looking at three different scenarios that are 
possible here: One, the status quo; two, the Edison takeover; and three, the Tucson merger. Of the 
different proposals before us, the Edison takeover looks like the most devastating to the com 
at large, both from the ratepayers' point of view and from the community. I think you've 
heard the concerns that the Mayor voiced about San Diego should now -- should not and shall not be 
allowed to become a suburb of Los Angeles or its utilities. And I think we stand very strongly on the 
advantages of a major community like San Diego having that right. But beyond that, there are 
issues. One is, we're looking at a proposal that says that, in the next few years, Edison will be as 
expensive as San Diego Gas & Electric where SDG&E has the possibility of continuing a reduction 
while Edison has the opposite. The third scenario, Tucson shows that, while Edison today is at 8.6 per 
kilowatt hour in expenditure -- I mean in cost -- Tucson is at 7, and Tucson has maintained that. 
we have a concern about the acid-rain issue, the acid-rain issue in comparison to the problems 
with Edison are that the non-attainment of Los Angeles and San is a 
major problem for the generation of power for the ratepayers here. And the impacts on air quality is 
a major concern for the citizens here. 
The San Diego Gas & Electric has worked very hard at importing or having very, very clean, 
natural gas to be able to generate the electricity to avoid adverse air quality impacts. There is a 
very strong possibility that that natural gas, if a takeover was done by Edison, would be shipped up 
north to fulfill their clean-air requirements in the Los Angeles Basin. And I think we can all agree 
there may be problems with acid rain. But compare -- but Los Angeles's contribution to the air basin 
problems in the Los Angeles Basin is much more severe than the acid-rain contribution being made 
Tucson Electric and that the regultory restrictions on the non-attainment counties are going to be 
immense. 
We have a problem with the fact that we're looking at three different proposals, Mr. Chairman. 
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CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank very much. Michael Executive Director of 
Consumers Action 
summarize some 
concern, there has 
thusfar. The financial up a 
Thank you for 
the 
voiced 
that the 
consolidation movement 
consolidations and means 
utilities is a to their loss of the natural monopoly, 
which the can retain some, if not their monopoly powers. 
what the financial And I guess the I raised for the 
to consider is whether this is what the or, is the Legislature now faced 
an to continue to break down the and continue to 
years. Now I don't know encourage the been over the last 
answer to this question, but I think it's a that warrants further investigation by this 
committee and the Legislature. Now not confident it's going to be examined by the PUC in these 
A second point, one raised and I think it's an excellent point: Is the 
consideration of alternatives to the merger -- and this cannot be overstated -- the Legislature 
should take action in the next session to ensure that the net benefits demonstrated the utilities be 
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have to look at what the alternatives would have or, even how to treat the dilution of the 
stock effect that was raised by Assemblywoman Moore. So I think that the standard has to be the net 
benefits over the alternatives and not just look at net benefits overall. 
in a very, in a very exhaustive and, I think, complete list of for 
consideration, you raised the question: Should the merger proponents be rate 
reductions to customers? I'm not sure, at least my reading of law, suggests that not sure 
can. I think the PUC is the final arbiter on that question. But I certainly would like to see the PUC 
be compelled to grant some kind of rate reduction or ensure some kind of rate reduction in order for 
a merger to be approved. 
Now I'd like to touch on some of the concerns that I've listed in my prepared statement. There 
were four concerns. Hopefully, we have time for it today. The (inaudible) of the CPUC 
jurisdiction by FERC, the impact of the Edison merger on competition in this state, the need for 
additional funding of CPUC auditors, and most importantly, a strengthening of the few statutes that 
address the issues that have been raised by this merger. 
On the first point, I think Professor Fellmeth has outlined our reasons for concern about the 
FERC jurisdiction expansion, and it's in the PUC jurisdiction. And we agree with the City Attorney 
that this is a great concern of ours. But I don't share Commissioner Wilk's confidence that this 
jurisdiction is not threatened. In fact, in the proposed decision on the Swiphole (?) case that was just 
released on Friday, the PUC judge has acknowledged that there are real limits to PUC jurisdiction in 
interstate transactions and it's one that's considered in this decision. So I think that 
Commissioner Wilk's confidence is somewhat misplaced. 
Secondly, we're concerned about the impact of either merger upon the burgeoning 
in the energy production industry. It is UCAN's the record, that competition, if 
will benefit large and small customers. We feel that the issues on this competition issue 
have been (?) by the Professor and by the Attorney General. We do want to 
reiterate our concerns about this. 
that been touched upon if either merger is approved, the 
CPUC will encounter accounting and cost allocation nightmares that could probably give migraines to 
the best of auditors. We are very concerned that the CPUC auditing staff is not sufficiently funded 
to effectively scrutinize the accounting machinations that will come about through these new merged 
utilities. They are going to be unlike any of the other concerns that we've seen in the past, 
and we feel that the auditing staff of the CPUC may not have the experience and the funding to do 
that job properly. 
Our final concern is probably our greatest concern and it involves the existing statutes that 
address the ability of holding companies to purchase power utilities. Commissioner Wilk has alluded 
to the very important questions that he raised in his directive on the interpretations of 852 and 854. I 
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-- I'm sorry. I think the stakes involved here are far too 
have made very clear. The are too 
The final like to raise in the time alloted concerns the 
that will be held. I am confident that administrative 
the PUC be 
in order to be 
as the earlier 
administrative 
will be held 
and I share Moore's concerns that these will not allow for a thorough evaluation of 
the of either the Edison or the Tucson mergers. And I would hope that you, the 
will continue your the on 
case and that he will make clear to the Commission your desire to have 
of the mergers. one of our 
recommended two weeks of on this issue. We feel two weeks is 
committee will use 
clear to the Commission. 
think that about covers our 
additional facts that I've over here 
would urge you to review my 
and some statements that 
and I thank you for our concerns in the session. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. 
abilities to 
statement for 
not mentioned 
WRIGHT: I know if this was addressed or not because I had to go out 
make a phone call. In adc your concerns in to mergers, are you talking about it 
was San Diego Gas & Electric merging with Tucson or whether San Diego Gas & Electric 
with Edison? Do you see them as two different situations since Tucson is a smaller company o:r 
smaller utility than Southern California Edison is? 
MR. SHAMES: Both mergers present very profound and, I think, dangerous implications. They 
both have to be looked at. And my statements here thusfar pertain to both mergers, Edison and TEP. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: And your basic criteria is that it is beneficial to the 
ratepayers? You're not interested even if awash? 
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MR. SHAMES: No, I don't believe it should be approved if it's awash. I think it must be a net 
benefit to ratepayers, yes. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: they prove net benefit but cannot 
any of that kind of information down the line, say, five or ten years down the line? Then where are 
you coming from? 
MR. SHAMES: Completely inadequate. I think the considerations, as I point out in my 
statem must be long-term as well as short-term. But they have to be clear. We 
promises; we accept, you know, maybe, may not. There has to be some degree of certainty, 
which is one of the reasons why I think we require very in-depth hearings before the PUC, none of 
this expedited two-week hearing process. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Because the only thing I'm not familiar with is what kind of 
service is being delivered here in San Diego. But if the service here in San Diego, even today, is not 
what you would like it to be, and the merger proved to be more beneficial basically in service, not 
necessarily in cost, where do you come from then? 
MR. SHAMES: I think that alludes back to my earlier statement which is that SDG&E must 
show that this merger is an improvement over the alternative that it may have available to it. For 
example, we don't see yet why SDG&E could not contract with Tucson, for the purchase of Tucson's 
power, to the access to Tucson's transmission network. Why do they have to have a merger? Why 
can't they use the alternative of contracting or power pooling, which has been proved beneficial in 
the past? I think that that's a showing that SDG&E's going to have to make in order for us to feel 
comfortable that this merger is truly beneficial to the public. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: You think that contracting can be less costly than owning the 
company yourself? 
MR. SHAMES: Absolutely, because, as pointed out before, through contracting, the open 
market has access to reviewing the contracts, to making sure that the arrangements and the terms in 
those contracts are, in the best that the open market can provide. And when you have a 
merger, and you don't have clear contracts that have been bid upon, then there's no assurance that 
there would not -- that that is the best deal, that the open market could not provide a better deal 
than the that Tucson and SDG&E has made. We want it open to the market to 
determine whether the transactions between the two utilities are, in fact, the most cost effective. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Any other questions? Okay. Our next witness will be David Moore, 
Business Manager/Financial Secretary of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 
Local 465. 
MR. DAVID MOORE: Is this mike on? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes. 
MR. MOORE: Good afternoon, Chairman and Assembly Members. I welcome the opportunity to 
participate in this hearing with regard to utility mergers in California. 
Prior to the announcement to the public that SDG&E and Tucson was going to merge, I was 
invited to --I had it laid out in front of me of what was going to take place, what their plans were --
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competitive for SDG&E to go with Tucson. If that's anti-competitive, what of their takeover? 
And again, looking at the overall picture and talking with the both non-union and 
union it is a consensus that we would support, and continue to the merger of 
Tucson and SDG&E and do we can to block or the so-called merger or hostile 
takeover which I believe is coming down the road with Southern Cal Edison. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Question, Assemblywoman? 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: You mentioned 80,000 were put out of jobs? 
MR. MOORE: This was asserted, yes, between '86 .•• 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: This is nationwide? 
MR. MOORE: This is nationwide. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Over what time period? 
MR. MOORE: May of, between May of '86 through '87, latter part of '87. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: When you, do you talk about, how much of this would have 
probably been through attrition retirements? 
MR. MOORE: Most of these figures are either reduced wages or cutbacks, mostly in layoffs. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Would you be opposed to a merger, say, if it was set up so that it 
would be through a process of attrition? In other words, as people went into retirement, that's where 
the cuts would be taken in personnel? 
MR. MOORE: Well, we're in what they call that right now, "attrition" or "downsizing". When I 
took office in 1986, there were 2,005 employees I represented. That's normally half of the employees 
of SDG&E. Today there's 1,975. We have done this through attrition, downsizing, so on and so forth. 
I believe this is being done because of the upcoming battle they're going to have with these mergers. 
The work is still there. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Why do think ••• 
MR. MOORE: When you say would I propose, you would have to get the whole picture and look 
at it, what we're talking about. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: The other I would have: Where would, where would you 
think these-- what did he say, 1 jobs would be eliminated? 
MR. MOORE: what he claims it'd be. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: If you're 
$1,000 come from? 
MR. MOORE: 1,000 members? 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Uh-huh. 
MR. MOORE: 1,000 employees? 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Yeah. 
the same number of people, where would the 
MR. MOORE: I didn't make a statement. Howard Allen did. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: You did research to find out where they were coming from? I'm 
kind of curious because I know that my daughter works for Von's Market. And when Von's Market was 
in the process with Safeway, there was all this doom and gloom about all the ones who were going to 
each one 
for here -- let's say it's 
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MR. MOORE: Well, if you start-- if you cut back on maintenance, that's the less number of 
you have to worry about the work and you can sacrifice there. There is work 
done contractors to take up some of the slack. But it's off. The work is being put 
off. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: In talking -- as you go along this line, I'm to come back to 
you with that same line of questioning. But in putting this -- have you talked to the of 
Edison in Los Angeles at all --
MR. MOORE: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: -- a..•d got some idea what they think were the 1,000 employees 
have come from? 
MR. MOORE: There are representatives from Edison here, if you would rather pose a question 
to them. I'd rather have them speak for themselves. But I have talked with employees and also with 
union members up there. From what I gather, they're not in favor of the merger between Southern 
Cal Edison and SDG&E neither. But they can speak for themselves. If you would have, want some of 
my time ••. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I was trying to low ball that to you. 
MR. MOORE: If they want some of my time, they can gladly have it right now. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I'm still in the baseball season and you kind of missed the hit. 
But why don't I go to Michael Shames on some of the same questions about the quality of service and 
your concerns with what layoffs and what the merger will really do along those lines of service to 
customers. 
MR. SHAMES: Thank you. I'll be brief. We are concerned about what the impact upon the 
quality of service would be from the mergers. SDG&E has been in a downsizing mode for the last 
three years and continues to be so. It said it's going to be laying off through attrition 250 employees 
over the next three years. We expect that to happen. It may even be larger. 
The layoff suggested by Mr. Allen, our understanding was 1,000 employees through both 
utilities, not just SDG&E. And it certainly does seem to be doable, given the goals of SDG&E, 
certainly. In terms of the maintenance reductions, yes. Through the downsizing, there has been a 
reduction in the maintenance, particularly the transmission lines. And we're concerned that there 
have been additional power outages as a result of this layoff. However, I'm not entirely sure that's 
the result of the merger. My feeling is that that kind of downsizing is happening and ... 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: Well, that's the trend of utilities everywhere. It's competition. 
MR. SHAMES: Yeah. I'm not sure the merger's going to have that much of a greater impact. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. Steven Burton, speaking for the Independent Energy 
Producers Association. 
MR. STEVEN BURTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Assembly members. I wear two hats. I'm a 
Board Member for the California Independent Energy Producers; I'm also General Counsel to the 
SITHE (?) Energies Group. One of the members of the SITHE Energies Group is energy factors which 
is a San-Diego-based independent power producer. Our group produces power in 15 states. We have 
contracts with all three California utilities. 
The other experience that I bring to this hearing, having served from 1977 to 1979 as General 
Counsel to the California Air Resources Board, I'm somewhat familiar with the potential problem 
- 61-
State will face when FERC has 
IEP has not taken a 
The 
to the 
itself. 
A more recent case deals the 
to allocate costs between various 
this Tucson merger were to go 
alifornia would face diminished 
San As 
We have three 
with SDG&E in 
San Gas & Electric. San 
all of our 
At the 
San Gas & Electric is 
That includes New York 
to the air 
to close 
Idaho 
of 
either merger 
utilities than it ,...,,~.,..,,, 
OPPOS1rlt!2 the of 
concern. 
consider 
may have been 
very with 
to rule out 
decisions may or may 
FERC has taken that power for 
where the FERC decided that it was 
any 
PUHCA and to 
as to the individual 
but that the State of 
the that was 
for our own 
Gas Electric would be a 
United States Those contracts were 
on 105 of power to 
senior not at the level of 
a but at the senior level, has 
of those contracts. They went to FERC 
went to the California Coastal 
these created a 
control district in San 
on these projects. 
on the 
and tried 
Once again, 
that 
Colorado 
dealt with anywhere in 
and so on. So if one of the that came out of this merger was that we had more reasonable 
to deal with-- and I can say that because we have contracts with Southern California Edison; 
we have contracts with PG&E --I think it would be an ent. 
As far as competition itself is concerned, I don't believe that the merger with Edison will create 
a for competition. If this needs power, the PUC has a bidding process, will be 
able to bid for that power. If SDG&E on its own, bid for that power but we'll have a very 
difficult time implementing contracts. The 
would be the Tucson merger because, once a.15a. ... , 
from a competition point of view, I believe, 
lose the support of the California PUC. What 
SDG&E will love to do is have each QF ect become a ball. And try and bat it back 
a.."'ld forth between the two state commissions that ultimately can go to FERC and stall 
us for years at a time. That costs millions of dollars. It doesn't do consumers any It 
do our any good. 
So to you, as is that you take a careful at what it is that it 
be required if either of these mergers go through. The California Court, I think, is very 
willing to protect your authority, to protect the PUC's authority. The U.S. Supreme Court may not 
be so willing to do that but it will look to a standard of reasonableness. And if there's legislation 
place that has criteria by which a state utility can merge with a utility in another state that appears 
reasonable, is to the benefit of the citizens of that state, I think such legislation will have a 
much better chance of standing up. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. There's one other member who has not yet 
arrived, and we'll hear from Bill Nelson, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Chamber of 
Commerce of San Diego when he comes in in a few minutes because we're a little bit ahead of 
schedule. 
At this point, what I'd like to do is to go to the sign-up sheet and I'll just call the names out and 
please come to the microphone and tell us why you think something should or shouldn't be done. Ray 
Sanborne. We're a little bit ahead of schedule so that it gives them an opportunity to come in. Dean 
Cofer. Ray Sanborne, Dean Cofer. 
MR. RAY SANBORNE: Yes. At this point in the program, how much time do I have? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, if you don't repeat what's already been said, you can take 
almost as much time as you need. 
MR. SANBORNE: Oh, great. (Laughter) 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Because ••• 
MR. SANBORNE: I don't have -- I don't think I'll be repeating too much that's 
said. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Have you been here all day? 
MR. SANBORNE: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: 
MR. SANBORNE: I to shed a of 
focus for you some of first-hand 
that been ar.d third hand. or as 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. 
not been said or 
some of the 
been 
MR. SANBORNE: And so in the area that you feel that I am treading in an area that you're 
already up the speed on, I'd be happy to move on. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. Identify yourselves and figure on five minutes and then 
see if you need any more. 
MR. SANBORNE: Okay. I'm Ray Sanborne and I'm the Business Manager/Financial Secretary of 
Local 4 7 of the International Brotherhood of Electric Workers. I represent approximately 6,000 union 
workers of the Southern California Edison Company. There are approximately 8,000 union workers on 
the property of which the utility workers of America represent the other 2,000. 
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man that killed his parents and then to the for mercy because he's now an The 
wrong with the is that the judge would have thrown him out of court but the PUC 
passed on the $384 million to the ratepayers. What will if they are allowed to now 
San Diego Gas? What can we expect? We can expect a much larger base of customers which 
can then 
to the 
their cogeneration through Mission Energy and pass those same unregulated 
of San 
with 
What about the humane treatment of employees that Edison has promised to the people of 
San Diego? I submit to you that the proof again is right in the pudding. They will not be humane to 
those people. Why would they be? They're not humane to the people that we and the 
that have worked with them for 30 years. The people that they write, and they write regularly 
and say, "You have made this company what you are. We appreciate your efforts. Without you, we 
would not be what we are today." But those same people, since they've got their holding place, we 
have gone through one reduction of one department after another. And people have gone back to the 
very jobs that they started in for Edison 30 years ago, clear back to the bottom. And you know who's 
doing their work? People in other departments on overtime, contractors that they're bringing in that 
are not qualified, which are causing power outages, which we are then having to fix for the 
contractor, which is not being billed, back-billed to the contractor that did the shoddy work. It is 
being charged against Edison's overhead. There's a real close examination of the problems here that 
needs to be looked at. You have a merger with Tucson which has excess power. You have an 
economy out there that can use the power to sell to -- and a community here that needs it. We 
have that criteria. It's already been spoken to by a number of people. Those criteria do not fit the 
Edison, San Diego thing. The only thing that fits, and the only thing that drives the push to merge 
with San Diego is a key phrase: "The nation's largest utility company". You have a megamanic that 
is running the Southern C Edison Company He is a profit-oriented individual. He does 
not care about employees. I you to show me a example of where he has done anything 
humane for the employees of the Southern California Edison Company in the last three years. He 
wants to make a name for himself. He wants to build the empire in the State. You ask in 
your papers: Will the PUC be able to effectively regulate Edison? And I submit to you they will not. 
cannot effectively regulate Edison. They don't know what's going on in Edison. They 
cannot possibly know. 
Look at the San Inofre (?) that we had sometime ago where they ship trainloads of 
paper work north for the PUC to and go and make a determination about whether or not 
certain things should be allowed in a rate base. Nobody could humanly comprehend that volume of 
paper work that they generated. And the problems with the contractors, the subsidies to the 
contractors, the overtime that they spend, they force people to work under threat of termination at 
year's end to get the budget so that they can the same plus more the following year. 
The overhauls, the repairs of the same facilities, two and three times in a one- and two-year period 
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ROSENTHAL: 
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MR. SANBORNE: The PUC, 
concerned about it. Your 
at a PUC 
as a matter of 
last week. They did not seem to be 
Ms. has shown more interest in 
and has more attention than anyone else in the state as to trying to determine what's going 
on in that 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I kind of asked to a little bit about it but that's okay. 
MR. SANBORNE: sorry. What would you like me to explain again? 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: was to understand a little bit. Give me an example 
you consider work up employees that's been contracted out and 
come back and correct. Give me some idea of what about. 
MR. SANBORNE: contractors that come in -- take the whole field. Contractors that 
come into a are loaned Edison are loaned Edison supervision to the supervisor crews 
are not to the contractors that come in in the middle of 
and do not have the necessary tools or materials to do the job and they are giving them out of 
Edison stock. All of that is the Edison crews and is being made to make the 
Edison worker look less productive and less efficient and the contractors more efficient. That 
on a daily basis. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: Well, do 
going to provide the tools and the workers --
MR. SANBORNE: Certainly. 
bid the contract with the understanding that 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: -- and the supervisors? 
MR. SANBORNE: They bid a job at a price to complete it but then they don't do it that way 
and they are supplemented by it, yes, and we've provided documentation on that. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I'd like to see some of that documentation again, I guess, and I'd 
like to maybe pursue this a little further. 
MR. SANBORNE: Sure. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: Because I think that there 
be another hearing at which time the utilities can make their case and it's 
to hear from Edison and SDG&E and some of the others on this. 
MR. SANBORNE: Sure. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Assemblywoman Wright? 
is to have to 
kind of hard. like 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Maybe I'm picking up on something that Gwen said but I was 
thinking in a different vein. You know, you keep making, making charges. 
MR. SANBORNE: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: And that's fine. 
MR. SANBORNE: Fine. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: But when it comes to a point of a decision being made as to 
whether anyone is going to be reprimanded, punished, or fined, or whatever, you've got to have the 
documentation. You would have to have copies of contracts that show exactly what they contracted 
for. Do they contract for just labor? Do they contract for labor and supervisors? Do they contract 
for labor, supervisors, and equipment? Those are the things you have to have and--
MR. SANBORNE: We have that. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: -- then you would have to be able to track it through and see if, 
indeed, what you're saying is that the Edison employee was being charged, basically, with 
incompetence because of something that was done by the hired, or contracted labor. And that's what 
you've got to have because you can stand here and say to us all you want. But if you want anything to 
go into a court to make a determination, whether you have the Legislature as that court requesting 
additional legislation or whether you're going to an actual court in the judiciary system to ask for 
for it. You're to have to have the documentation and you're going to have to 
have the documentation over a long period of time. 
MR. SANBORNE: I understand that and we have that documentation and we have provided 
much of that documentation. 
ASSEMBYLWOMAN MOORE: Mrs. does that mean if he has that documentation, you 
would be interested in it? 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Yes, I would, because there's so many times that we sit here--
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I understand that. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: -- and we have concern for what people are saying. But then 
when it comes down to have it documented where you can really go to bat with it, you don't have it. 
And you've got to have that. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: And I think ••. 
MR. SANBORNE: No, I take strong exception to that. I do have it. I'm telling you I have it. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: I haven't seen it. I'm hearing you for the first time. 
MR. SANBORNE: And I'm telling you I would be willing to provide it to you. 
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ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: Southern California Edison when can talk. We need to have 
kind documentation because when we talk about benefits-- you heard a little bit 
about the trickle-down 
MR. SANBORNE: Um-hmm. 
ASSEMBLWOMAN MOORE: And we wa..""It to know a little bit about what's going to happen with 
the 
it trickles. And if it's not ••• 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: If it 
MOORE: Or But at any rate -- and I think that at that time it'd be 
for whatever kind of information that you have to make that available, and I'll 
make sure that you're very high up on the program because I think those are the kinds of concrete 
kinds of that need to be reviewed in to make a decision because we're concerned, not 
with the workers from the individual but what the implications are for the ratepayer of 
California and all of us, to our persuasion, want the best for the people in 
alifornia and what's in the best interest in the for everyone. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: And done efficiently. 
MR. SANBORNE: Pardon? 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: And done efficiently. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: correct. 
MR. SANBORNE: Yes. two other points that I think -- again, I understand this hearing 
not to talk about this ect but two other very critical points that I think you need to 
at least have your appetite whetted on. And one is, what is happening under the cogeneration as 
Edison is running it through their Mission Energy subsidiary? I doubt that you even have any idea of 
the amount of paid-for generation around the Edison system that is now being mothballed and the 
number of good Edison jobs that are being lost as a result of them, in effect, transferring regulated 
generation to their non-regu. ated subsidiaries so that they can sell it back to themselves and then 
pass that price on with a market to the ratepayers. The number of megawatts in the Edison system, 
which are sitting out there, more efficient, say, better use of the natural resources and more cost 
effective for the ratepayers that is sitting out there mothballed today because they have that 
unregulated subsidiary would shock you. And something needs to be done about that and certainly, I 
am at a very low level in this society to try and change it and I understand some of the changes that 
we're needing is at a federal level. But certainly, you people are in a position to help look into that 
and bring pressure to bear on Washington to change those and that needs to be done. 
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The other thing that I think that you need to be aware of, and I'm not here to directly talk about 
our particular fight with Edison on any given issue, but you need to understand that if a 
is involved here, a company that is bragging to anyone that will and even 
about making all-time record profits while at the same time demanding all-time rf'cord 
takeaways from their employees, there is something wrong with that. That is bad public policy, I 
believe. And I certainly submit to you that, if they are doing it to their existing employees who have 
made the company what they are today, there is no reason whatsoever to believe that they're going to 
do anything better for San Diego's employees and their citizens if they take over this utility. And 
that concludes my remarks and thank you very much. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you, Mr. Sanborne. (Applause) 
We had one other person who was on the other panel who has just come in. And I'm to 
offer Mr. Bill Nelson, Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce of greater San Diego, an opportunity 
to make his presentation. 
MR. BILL NELSON: Thank you, Senator Rosenthal. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Is the mike on? Is the mike on? 
MR. NELSON: Does this work better, you think? I'm sorry. I did want to offer my apologies to 
you. We at the Chamber annually have an enlisted Recognition Day here in San Diego. It's very 
important to San Diego since one out of every six people in the United States Navy serves in this 
community. We really appreciate them and we've been fortunate enough to have Ambassador 
Jean Kirkpatrick speak to us. And I do want to offer my apologies. But in behalf of the Chamber, 
and I have given you a written statement but I wish to stress it, now the Greater San Diego Chamber 
of Commerce opposes the attempt by Southern California Edison to acquire San Diego Gas & Electric 
and assume its service territory. The Chamber's position is not based on any antipathy toward 
Southern California Edison nor a belief that it's not a good utility. On the contrary, our investigation 
leads to the conclusion that it's an excellent operation serving its territory well and providing rewards 
and incentives to its employees and stockholders. 
Now I should also say, particularly at this point, this is not only a rare event for the 
it's totally unique. The Chamber allows, or does not get ourselves involved, with corporate takeovers. 
We've lost PSA; we've lost companies such as IVAC (?) and others, those who do not, we believe, serve 
as an appropriate vehicle for Chamber of Commerce concern. In this particular the 
Chamber took the view that we believe we must think of the community benefit rather than, but not 
derogation, of the narrow interests of the ratepayer and the stockholders, and employees. These are 
extremely important and must not be ignored in any final resolution. I'm sure you're not going to 
ignore them, as well as not going to ignore the total statewide interest. I'm very frankly speaking 
specifically for San Diego and the San Diego community. 
We became convinced, after our investigation, that the greater community good would be best 
served by allowing a proven management in place to respond to the challenges of San Diego and to 
pursue the strategy they have already formulated to serve this area. The proposed merger would 
create the biggest public utility in the United States, at least until it encourages other mega-
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mergers. But would big be better? However much it may help SCE to find a high-growth area to 
its capacity, it would be on the combination would grab a 
of the attention of the authorities and it would stifle innovation. 
In the industry, the new ideas and services 
a of companies across various territories. Their successes prompt 
emulation with others that have good Errors are also rapidly disseminated and 
are instructive. The wealth of this new would dominate the utility industry. It would 
have no incentive to innovate or to accommodate new ideas. can govern and control 
excess but it cannot stimulate. We've face the prospect differences which are not meaningful in an 
atmosphere of zero risk, zero gain. 
Let me also take this opportunity to point out that the management of San Diego Gas & 
Electric over the last few years has been 
admitted their errors, intelligently faced their 
in the true sense of that word. They've honestly 
and have produced a powerful strategy to 
not only meet the problems but to position themselves for decades for better service for this 
community. Obviously, this is good in a direct sense; less obviously, it's GREAT as an example to all 
our other businesses. During many years, San Diego Gas & Electric has been a willing contributor of 
' executive talent to our community efforts. Their latest efforts raise this contribution to a new level 
of exemplary conduct. 
Again, while we salute SCE for their ability, we also thank them for pointing out what a 
powerful management team Mr. Page has built. And I wish to thank you again for your attention. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. We will now go back to the open 
microphone. Dean Cofer? 
MR. DEAN COFER: Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, my name is Dean Cofer. I'm 
with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 4 7, which is the Local that represents 
the at the Southern California Edison 
One brief remark, I want to point out that over 100 working men and women from the Edison 
Company took a day off without pay today to be outside this building picketing to show their disfavor 
and distrust of the California-- Southern California-- Edison Company. With that, I'd like to 
withdraw my name and Mr. Stewart's (?) name which is the next speaker. Thank you very much. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, Mister-- thank you very much, Mr. Cofer. Tli"en Mr. Stewart 
(?) will not be speaking? 
MR. COFER: That's col rect. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Kimberly Bitterness (?)? John Chavot, C-h-a-vo-t? 
MR. BERNARDO GARCIA: Mr. Chavot is withdrawing his name as well. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Withdrawing his name. All right. 
MR. GARCIA: I think I follow him. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Bernardo Garcia? 
MR. GARCIA: Correct. I've prepared a written statement that I'd like to submit. I have the 
original and about 10 or 15 copies. 
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CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Give them to the sergeant, please. And us the--
it, if you will. 
MR. GARCIA: Well, I think the written statement for so like to make a 
oral comments. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you. 
MR. GARCIA: First of all, I'd like to thank the Committee for providing me an 
speak here today. As I stated, my name is Bernardo Garcia. I'm the Business Agent for U 
Workers Union of America, Local 246. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Are you here to represent the 2,000 workers (inaudible) ? 
MR. GARCIA: Correct. We represent the Southern California Edison employees in the Steam 
Generation Divisions and Nuclear Operations. I think we represent a unique interest that of an 
employee representative, stockholder, as well as ratepayers. Our main concern is the loss of jobs, 
and I'll give you a specific example: Southern California Edison Company, Howard P. has 
publicly announced that he will cut 1,000 jobs if the SCE/SDG&E merger is approved and claims this 
will lower electric rates. 
We believe that any rate reductions would be negligible as employee costs are a small 
percentage of electric rates. During the last two years, SCE has reduced the number of jobs overall 
yet has failed to realize a rate reduction. SCE rates have actually increased three times this year. 
We do not feel this is in the best interests of the ratepayers because these perceived rate reductions 
will not endure the test of time. As utilities diversify and grow, we should take a closer look at their 
non-regulated as well as regulated activities. Big is not necessarily better. 
SCE has proven this. They have cut jobs, diversified, and are currently attempting to cut 
employee benefits. Yet it failed to realize a corresponding reduction in rates. The legislator -- -
lature -- excuse me -- should investigate these areas further and enact legislation that addresses the 
concerns raised here today. The PUC has allowed SCE's subsidiary power sales to grow unchecked 
and at a substantial cost to the ratepayers, illustrated by the recent 11 percent rate increase. Should 
these mergers be allowed to 
position of being 
the nation. 
without further investigation? We'll find ourselves in 
to undue a monopoly which could be the of this 
I urge you to hold additional hearings at additional locations to provide all the 
opportunity to present their views. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much, Mr. Garcia. (Applause) Gary Estes? 
MR. GARY ESTES: Good afternoon. Can you hear me? Is this thing on? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes. 
in 
an 
MR. ESTES: Cannot tell from where I am. My name is Gary Estes and what I'd like to do is 
basically two things, is, one, let you know what my bias is, 'cause we all have a bias, and so 
clear to you, and then what our interest is in utility mergers. 
I work for a company called Hunter Industries and we're located in North San Diego County in 
the City of San Marcos. And at Hunter Industries, we manufacture landscape sprinklers by a 
- 71-
sales in 
."'""'"'"' ... "' process. And we 
would be somewhere around 
410 employees, and our annual 
million. Founded in 1, our products are sold 
the world. Hunter concerns with gas a>J.d electric rates come from the fact 
over a of a million dollars on electric and gas to our We have a 
which is rated at 690 about my company. 
And a little bit about my background, I've been involved with utility issues since 1976 when I 
in the Virginia State Office of the Attorney General in the Division of Consumer 
ouncil. Our mandate for that division was to the interest of consumers before 
U Regulatory Commission known as the State Corporation Commission. 
Well, after two and a half years with the Attorney General's Office, my wife and I moved to San 
And since 1979, I have been involved with San Diego Gas & Electric in utility issues. In 1981, 
I represented the United Federation of Small Business before the PUC in SDG&E's 1982 general rate 
case. And in that proceeding, we dealt 
business. 
with rate issues as they impact small 
In , I founded the San Diego Cogeneration Users Group. The Cogeneration Users Group is 
of the end owners and users of cogeneration systems. And the group was formed for two 
reasons: One, to share practical information about the design, operation, and maintenance of 
cogeneration systems, the nuts and bolts of and also to keep up with the regulatory PUC 
legislative FERC activity which goes on which impacts the economics of cogeneration systems. And 
this group continues today to be a link between the end users to maintain this awareness amongst 
them. 
The Cogeneration Users Group was a foundation for the creation of another group called the 
San Energy Alliance. The Alliance was formed in 1985 and we are affiliated with the 
California Manufacturers Association. The Energy Alliance is composed of members of the CMA and 
non-members of the CMA who the before the PUC. In 1985, we put together the first 
representation of a diverse group of San Diego businesses before the PUC because the 
continued increase of electric rates for commerical and industrial customers as compared to 
residential customers were just out of control. In that case, which was the 1986 general rate case, 
the PUC heard us and we saw some signficant reductions in the increases to commercial and 
industrial customers. And since 1985, I have served as Executive Director of the San Diego Energy 
Alliance. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTH; L: Mr. Estes--
MR. ESTES: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: -- would you tell us, get to the point of --
MR. ESTES: Okay, sir. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: -- how you think the subject of this hearing, merger, affects what 
you're talking about. 
MR. ESTES: I'd be glad to, sir. The concern that we have is end energy users, is that no matter 
which merger occurs, what we are seeing is a change in the marketplace. We see gas companies not 
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out to be competitive. And the experience we've had with San Diego Gas & Electric is that we 
it's time that, no matter which merger may go through, is that the Gas Department of the U 
must be separated from the electric side. The gas side needs to be a independent, 
corporation with an interest of selling natural gas not having the Gas Department as the 
the Electric Department. 
Our experience in San Diego was that the Gas Department can only do what the Electric 
Department tells them they can do. And there truly is competition between electric, 
an energy source and natural gas as an energy source. San Diego is the only major utility in the 
of California with the need for generation capacity. And last year, they put an outrageous effort 
upon to kill existing and future cogeneration systems in San Diego County when they could have had 
small businesses put up their own money, put up their own risk capital to put it in this 
facilities and SDG&E tried to destroy those who had already made those investments and prohibit the 
people who wanted to put in systems. And the way they do that is with their rates, and the concern 
we have is they'll play around with their gas prices to try to help their Electric Department. And no 
matter which merger occurs, I think as a matter of public policy, they should have to divest 
themselves in the natural gas portion from the electric side, either sell it to SoCal Gas or have, 
sell it off to another set of investors. And so that's our basic concern for the issue you have before 
you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. 
MR. ESTES: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Any questions? 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Let me ask one question. 
MR. ESTES: Yes, ma'am. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: I didn't have a chance to say anything to the gentleman who 
represented the Chamber of Commerce. But you heard from the independent producers' 
you were in the audience at the time. 
MR. ESTES: Yes, ma'am, I was. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: And he was really down on San Diego. 
MR. ESTES: Yes, they've been very uncooperative for cogeneration. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: And yet you have the Chamber of Commerce in full 
the San Diego Gas & Electric. And to me, if I'm hearing correctly, you're more siding with the 
independent producers and that you're saying there is the problem where you have one company with 
both energies involved? 
MR. ESTES: There is. There is a problem when you have one utility control both the gas and 
electric. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: You think that's what's happening right now with San 
Gas & Electric? 
MR. ESTES: Yes, it's interesting that SDG&E, they'll go out and promote gas air 
when SoCal Gas will go out and promote cogeneration. So it's a difference of focus and we think it's 
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important that those energy sources be separate so you can have, truly have competition to get to the 
cheapest cost of electricity by people who can cogenerate because they're 70 percent efficient, 
where the utility is only 35 percent efficient when you convert those energy resources to electricity. 
So still in this nation, we have to have energy conservation and that's why a reasonable person, I 
think, can see that cogeneration is at 70 percent is better than at 35 percent when a utility does it. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much, Mr. Estes. 
MR. ESTES: Thank you for your time. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: That concludes the list. Does anybody feel a strong desire to give 
us another minute? Please come forward. Introduce yourself. 
MR. DON KLEIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Don Klein and I represent 
Ratewatchers. We're an advocacy group here in San Diego. I wasn't going to make any remarks today 
but I just feel compelled to do this, particularly because in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, you 
asked us if the laws and regulations were sufficient on the books today to handle this situation. The 
expert panels have given us some, some direction in that area. And I'm not an attorney but I do have 
a strong background in regulatory matters with the airlines. 
During that time, the Public Utilities Commission did regulate the airlines and so during that 
time we also, the Commission was also involved with the federal and the state. And that is a 
possibility that may occur here in the event that Tucson occurs. We certainly, the Public Utilities 
Commission, certainly does not want to lose any of its strength. And one of the problems now is that 
it has no strength. There is no enforcement branch to the Public Utilities Commission. They cannot 
find people; they cannot issue orders to cease and desist practices. You've heard testimony today 
from the local labor people who were saying maintenance has been deferred, set aside; it allows to 
continue. The only thing the Public Utilities Commission can take testimony on these things after 
the fact, and many times, a year or more after the fact; in some cases, three years after the fact in 
general rate cases. And by that time, the damage is done; the operators have gone on to do whatever 
else they can do and compound their errors. And I certainly don't have the answer to this. But I 
suggest that if you want to put some teeth into these problems that you've heard here and elsewhere 
in other meetings-- and I've heard them many, many times, boringly, many, many times when they're 
not completed-- you must give enforcement to the Public Utilities Commission so that they can 
enforce the laws that are on the books and not wait for three years. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you, sir. Anyone else feel compelled? Yes, please come 
forward. Tell us -- give us yc ur name for the record. 
MR. JERRY LEE PENDER: My name is Jerry Lee Pender and I'm here to speak just as a 
consumer of electricity. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Ladies and Gentlemen of the panels. I've 
been a resident here in San Diego for about 20 years; and much of that time, I've paid Southern 
Gas & Electric money for their services. I've heard much about this merger between Edison and 
San Diego Gas & Electric. It is a concern of mine only because I live in California and I have, have to 
pay for electricity and gas. The merging of the companies, et cetera, is not new. But this one 
between these two power suppliers could become a big headache for me as well as my children and 
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their children, on down the line. 
I don't think many of us have read between the line, the of this merger. I 
you said was all in 
be here to if not them, their I 
no, no, let me rephrase that because in there's comes 
their stock to earn dividends. The of energy would like to make 
are real. This is the real world. 
someone say if San Gas & Electric needs a hundred 
it from some western supplier. Well, this energy will sooner or later have to be 
whom will this have to be paid-- I'm sorry. And by whom will have to pay this profit 
would 
To 
these two companies, to me, will create similar to a a of service. 
Take a question: If mom and pop are the only service providers, what 
consumer? I'll tell you. I'll probably get the shock treatment. 
to me as a 
As our resources go down, the demand gets greater, the bills keep increasing. What happens to 
the the low-income families, et cetera? I think we see the plight of the homeless already as 
People are working twice as hard and long because of inflation. These are 
times. We must make a prudent effort in having the decisions handled between this merger 
What we decide what this merger will affect consumers for years and years on down the line, not 
California but in the nation. I mean nuclear plants will have to be built, not to overly cost or 
poor design. Every rate increase seems to make my pockets or my savings decrease. 
In I would like to say competition is okay and merging is okay. But when you live in an 
environment where energy is for sale, the price tag can be very high. I remember as a I in 
home with no power, no electrical lights, and no gas. That was then and this is now. If you live 
within the city limits or in a county, then you must have a power hookup to a utility company. So 
I say it is time for us to go 
Thank you very are 
to be very to hear f:tom the 
at some 
And very 
--oOo---
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San Diego, California 
I am pleased to have been invited to appear before you 
to discuss public policy concerns with regard to mergers and 
acquisitions in the.electric utility industry. 
I should start by noting that consolidation by merger 
and acquisition was rather common during the earlier history of 
the electric utility industry. However, until quite recently, 
there has been very little such activity for approximately the 
last quarter century. The first wave of mergers and 
acquisitions resulted in the consolidation of many essentially 
local operations into the large electric public utility holding 
companies of the 1920s a 1930s. ter t passage of the 
Public Utility Holding any Act o 19 the industry went 
through a lengt period f ubs uct ring 
(including divestitures, reorganization rgers and 
acquisitions) as a result of efforts to con orm to the dictates 
of that legislation. 
That period of restructu ing left us with an industry 
of approximately 230 investor-owned elect ic (or combination 
electric and gas) companies, most of whi are substantial, 
vertically integrated companies, each providing generation, 
transmission, and distribution service within its service 
area. These investor-owned electric utilities co-exist with a 
-
much larger number of publicly owned systems. 
That is basically the way things have been for the 
last 25 years or so. During that period, however, major 
changes occurred in the way the industry operates. These 
changes resulted from the desire to achieve efficiency and 
economies in the cost of rendering service and improving the 
quality of service, primarily by increasing reliability. 
Rather than seeking to achieve these goals by industry 
consolidation, the industry followed a different approach: a 
strategy of industry cooperation through such means as the 
formation of power pools, the utilization of multi-company 
dispatch, participation in jointly owned generating units, 
coordination agreements, and greater use of economy energy 
transactions. 
During the last two or three years, many experts have 
predicted that the industry will undergo a substantial 
restructuring. Some in the financial community have reasoned 
that, in view of the good cash flow which many electric 
utilities presently generate, outside investors will find it 
attractive to acqLire control of a utility's common stock in a 
leveraged transaction at a price in excess of the stock's 
market and book value. Consequently, they have projected a 
wave of leveraged buyouts in the industry. 
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On the other hand, many economi t c t a a 
basic restructuring of the industry must occur because of the 
competitive environment which utilities now face in generation 
of electricity. These economists believe that is compe tive 
pressure will cause a breakup of vertical integrated 
structures and a wave of reorganizations (including 
divestitures, mergers and acquisitions) as the industry evolves 
toward what they view as a more efficient structure. 
Views differ, however, as to whether such a 
restructured industry will consist of far fewer major companies 
(vertically integrated or not) or of an amalgam of (1) a great 
many more large and small competitors providing generation, (2) 
a few large transmission companies which serve, at least in 
part, as common carriers, and (3) a greater number of smaller 
distribution entities which will be customers of both t 
generation and transmission companies. 
How has reality coincided with these predictions in 
recent months? 
1 . 
We have not seen the pr c wave o leveraged 
buyouts and tender offe s f om industry outsiders 
or from utility management in conjunction with 
industry outsiders. There have only three 
such cases of any magnitude. The f rst is the 
Alamito Company case, in which a utility had 
earlier spun off ce tain generating assets which 
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then became the object of a bidding war in a 
leveraged tender offer. In a second case, a 
substantial shareholder of NECO Enterprises, the 
holding company for Newport Electric, launched 
two unsuccessful tender offers for a majority of 
the Company's common stock and then later 
successfully acquired in excess of 50% of the 
common stock in open market transactions. The 
shareholder's reported objective was to obtain 
control of the company in order to spin off 
certain real estate assets which were believed to 
have a higher value for development purposes. 
In the third case, Public Service Company of 
Indiana was approached by a group of outside 
investors. This group withdrew when the 
management and board of PSI indicated that they 
would oppose the investor group. 
2. Municipal Takeovers. 
A second type of acquisition which has been in 
the news has been the possibility of municipal 
takeovers of portions of a utility's business. 
These have generally been motivated by high rates 
due to recent rate basing of large nuclear 
investments and the current availability in some 
parts of the country of abundant generating 
capacity. Certain municipalities are 
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invest at ng the possibili a 1 of 
a utili 's facilities within t aries of 
the municipality and perhaps some of the 
utility's generating and transmission capacity, 
but not all of the generating capaci 
especially not the nuclear capacity. The City of 
Chicago and the City of New Orleans are 
apparently considering such proposals. Whether 
we will actually see transactions of this type is 
open to question. A significant concern is that 
the current availability of abundant generating 
capacity for bulk power purchases may not 
continue into the future. 
3. Scattered Systems AcgJLisition. 
A third type of merger and acquisition 
transaction in the utility industry is probab 
germane only to the remaining smaller investor-
electric uti ities, o which there are 
still a few. A company ike Utilicorp United, 
formerly known iss r blic Service 
Company, has been acquiring scattered sma ler 
electric utility systems n the United States and 
Canada. This is really repl cation of what has 
been going on for some time n the wa e and 
sewer utility industry and in the independent 
telephone industry. We have also seen similar 
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acquisitions in the natural gas industry, for 
example by Arkla. While, because of the 
scattered nature of the systems involved, one 
cannot expect much in the way of operational 
efficiencies due to system integration, such 
transactions do have the potential to bring to 
small systems more sophisticated management; 
better technical know-how; the benefits of volume 
purchasing on a centralized basis; better 
engineering and planning processes; savings due 
to centralized accounting, data processing, and 
the like; and savings in cost of capital due to 
ease of marketing larger securities issues for a 
larger organization. 
4. Industry Consolidation. 
The fourth type of merger and acquisition 
transaction, and the one which is probably of 
most interest to these Committees, is the 
transaction which results in consolidation of 
substantial electric utility companies. It is 
here that we have seen most of the recent 
action. We have had in recent times the 
formation of Centerior, the holding company for 
Cleveland Electric Illuminating and Toledo 
Edison; the Southern Company acquisition of 
Savannah Electric; the Utah Power & Light -
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Pacif r~ merger proposal· 1 of 
Nantahela by Duke Power; the recent proposal for 
a merger of Central Maine and Central Vermont, in 
conjunction with an acquisition of the 
non-nuclear assets of Pu lie Service any f 
New Hampshire, which is currently in Chapter 11 
reorganization proceedings; and two propos s 
affecting this city, the San Diego Gas & 
Electric-Tucson Electric proposal and the SCE 
Corp.-San Diego Gas & Electric proposal. 
Justification for such proposed industry 
consolidations include a variety of perceived 
benefits. Generally, improved management 
sophistication is not an issue, since such large 
utilities do not differ markedly in the level of 
management sophistication. However, 
administrative and general cost savings, as well 
as customer cost savings, re of en cited. While 
such savings may, in fact, be possible, they are 
likely o be on a very l sea e whe compared 
to the tota of e ect ic t 1 costs, wh ch 
include costs of enormous magnitude, such as fuel 
costs, maintenance costs and capita costs. The 
primary area f paten i 1 s t al t 
savings is operational efficiencies. Such 
efficiencies could resul from system 
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integration; load diversity (winter peaking 
versus summer peaking and different on-peak 
hours); diversity of customer mix {a company with 
a heavy industrial load versus one with a heavy 
residential or agricultural load - combination of 
such diverse customer mixes can result in 
improved earnings stability, which in the long 
run will improve financial integrity and 
consequently reduce costs of capital); relative 
power plant efficiencies; relative long-run fuel 
costs and fuel access; diversity of fuel mix; 
improved economic dispatch; reduction in 
maintenance costs (particularly with regard to 
power plants); and the possibility of retirement 
and liquidation of surplus assets and deferral of 
capital expenditures. 
These areas should be carefully reviewed by regulators 
who are faced with a proposed industry consolidation in order 
to determine the long run benefits of such a transaction. 
One important point to note is that such savings may 
be possible by implementation of alternatives to a merger or 
acquisition, such as the previously mentioned realization of 
economies through cooperative efforts in increased power 
pooling, multi-company economic dispatch, jointly owned 
generating units, coordination agreements, and the like. 
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at 1 be 
necessi that the res lting enter e a e of ng-term 
nings stabili becau e , . s e s a to e I J.l 
secur the long-run financ a ). wh ch 
will in turn assure owe ong ca t 
I would add a note of caution here with reg a to 
oposed acquisitions invest s 
Such transactions do not ordinarily bring to t abl improved 
managerial, operational, or economic efficienci s. Ra her 
such efficiencies as may exist are general financial in 
ature. I confess t an overall concern about the extent to 
ich short-term financia ef ici r 
oday in our economy to the exclusion of ng- e econom c 
efficiencies. Such investors will be p ing more h n book 
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11 have more dolla s invested whic mus ea n r 
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a ring some of the 
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leverage). Since the business risk in a company is not likely 
to change as a result of such a transaction, the company's 
total risk (which is equivalent to its financial risk plus its 
business risk) must increase. Consequently, in the long-run, 
cost of capital is likely to increase, resulting in higher 
long-term rates to ratepayers. Except in the case of a utility 
which is in relatively serious financial difficulties, or in 
certain voluntary corporate divestitures of utility assets, I 
' confess to some skepticism regarding the long-term benefits of 
such transactions. 
A few words about the current regulatory structure as 
it applies to mergers and acquisitions in the electric utility 
industry. Applicable regulation at the federal level includes 
the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Public 
Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935, the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and 
the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division. Each of these 
agencies may have jurisdiction, depending on the nature of the 
transaction. The Antitrust Division will focus on the 
competitive aspects of a horizontal merger. The NRC will focus 
on the financial and managerial competence of the resulting 
company in relation to nuclear power plants. The SEC and FERC 
will basically look at the various public interest 
considerations which may be affected by the transaction. I 
will not take the time at this juncture to review in detail the 
regulatory functions of these federal agencies. I know that 
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under such statutes, the state regulators, in considering a 
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considerations. This has been variously interpreted in the 
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he criteria that have been considered a e: 
1. That the proposed transaction meets the test that 
it is n bes nter t 0 t c ume 
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6. The impact on service standards, that is, that 
the acquiring party has the proper managerial and 
technical competence, experience, integrity and 
financial responsibility to provide safe, 
reasonable and adequate service to the public. 
7. Interference with regulatory jurisdiction, that 
is, that the utility will continue to be subject 
to applicable laws, principles and rules 
governing the regulation of public utilities. 
8. The promotion of economies. 
9. The effect on rates. 
10. Fairness and reasonableness to shareholders. 
11. The effect of the transaction on the customer mix 
and projected demand forecasts. 
12. The effect of the transaction on obligations to 
employees with respect to pensions and other 
benefits. 
13. In recent cases (particularly the Utah-
Pacificorp proposal) the principal issue debated 
related to transmission. The concerns of other 
electric systems were (1) that the resulting 
company would have such a large transmission 
system that it would have control of access to 
transmission services, and would, therefore, be 
able to foreclose competition in the bulk power 
markets, and (2) that transmission by the 
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asset merger have announced that they will not testify before 
this Honorable Committee. I understand that litigation is 
pending between various parties to that merger. But I would 
argue that it is a transparent non sequitur to rely on pending 
litigation to excuse public testimony on utility merger plans. 
The state is the sovereign. It is our fundamental unit of 
political authority. Its Legislature is the single most 
important institution in our society, the repository of the power 
to tax, to decide what is and what is not a criminal act, and to 
protect the citizenry from a variety of abuses, including those 
deriving from entities which have obtained dispensation from the 
regulation of the marketplace. Power utilities are natural 
monopolies, which are, to quote the regulatory law term of art 
"affected with the public interest." They are given that most 
precious of privileges: an exclusive franchise to provide a 
necessity without competition. 
Moreover, the owners of those utilities are entitled, as a 
matter of law, to a "fair rate of return" on their investment. 
The first element of a conceptual structure for this Committee is 
a full appreciation of this fact: those stockholders providing 
the equity capital to a utility have a constitutional right to a 
market-related rate of return on their investment. And the 
utility is entitled to assess ratepayers the full cost of all 
operational expenses prudently incurred. Hence, those decisions 
which are made affecting that cost structure, unless disallowed 
by a Public Utilities Commission, will determine what we pay. 
And in the case of a momentous decision to merge operations, such 
2 
a isallowanc i fficult 
s state s 
Committee respo to that tio 
1 i ours a 
1 hearings 1 s 
relevant to the variables we shall discuss, 
rhetoric-1 f ers ( 11 not 
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answers 
ue 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to provide for certain filing 
and disclosure irements cash tender fers In 
19 82 the Supreme Court decided Edgar v. Mite Corporation 
interpreting the reach of that federal statute. In Edgar, 
Illinois had attempted to review a tender offer for a Chicago 
company under its state takeover review law. On a close vote, 
the Court held that the Illinois Act was an "indirect burden" on 
interstate commerce and struck the Illinois statutory review 
requirements. 
of interests: 
Note however, that this test involves a balancing 
"Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to 
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on 
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless 
the burden on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local 
purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree." Pike 
v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
Some commentators believe that state laws such as the PUC's 
power to review utility mergers 1 generally fall the face 
of the Williams Act and the test. (See Berger, The 
Constitutionality of State Agproval Requirements for the 
Acquisition or Transfer or Control of a Co~~on Carrier or Public 
Utility, 14 Transportation Law Journal 227 (1986).) I disagree. 
Certainly there is a trend toward greater federal involvement; 
witness the anti-takeover provision in Budget Reconciliation 
Act enacted at the end of 1987. This s ability of 
state and local government to use tax-exempt bonds to purchase 
gas or electric utilities. But the generic regulation of 
"no to a 
of rna util ies 
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Mississ Power Light must be pa by l 
that the retail customers must pay the costs as allocated 
notwithstanding a contrary judgement of the state commission with 
purported authority over retail rates. 
This case indicates two things: first, FERC jurisdiction may 
be significant not only on the merger question, but is rather 
certain to be significant after it. To the extent merged 
entities transfer power through separate entities, even entities 
perhaps created specifically to manipulate sales through 
successive transactions (making them "wholesale"), they may 
substantially subsume rate regulation at all levels. Where the 
FERC declares that the price of power produced by power company 
parent "x" to subsidiary "y" is their territory and that the 
customers of "y" must pay it as specified, it is unclear what is 
left for the state agency to do. 
Is there a solution? Perhaps. Here too, legislation could 
specifically e PUC jurisdiction over s affecting 
retail provision of power, and the PUC could be required to 
intervene in all FERC proceedings which might impose pass through 
costs onto its ratepayers. 
Standards 
The most minimal test for the approval of a merger is 
illustrated by the policy of the Connecticut Department of Public 
Utility Control. In approving the merger of three affiliated 
utilities, the Department concluded that' the "evidence in this 
case indicates that there will be no adverse impact to the 
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it i important to consider that many utilities t 
diseconomies of scale above a certain thres ld and many are l 
beyond that level. Our own studies of Pacific Bell's structure, 
for example, strongly indicate that there is no 1 
of scale structure. Inherent economies of scale which may attend 
increasing traffic across the same fixed cost structure are 
especially unlikely in a merger where different territories are 
simply hooked together. 
It is possible that one company in a merged structure will 
have assets of particular use to the partner and vice-versa, 
creating a synergy. But keep in mind a fundamental counter-
consideration. The sale or lease of an asset by one partner with 
the other cou theoretically be accomplished by contract an 
setting. It more 1 
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Dangers 
first disadvantage to a merger is the outcome 
any augmentation of economic or pol cal power. And a uti 
merger involves both. Lord Acton's famous " 
corrupts, absolute power corrupts abso .. more a 
cliche; it underlies our system of checks and balances. 
a natural monopoly is a necessary evil. Making it geographically 
or financially larger than the necessity of its natural monopoly 
dictates, and apart from any efficiency gain, cuts against the 
American assumption that larger lar r is not better. 
Indeed, all other things being equal, smaller better, local is 
better. A second and related general disadvantage to mergers 
be the enhanced 1 to structure 
the competitive sector; or to keep competitive forces and 
technological progress from 11 cost 
mo stment structure. f ase 
strate the regrettable cons ences powers 
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marketplace are now internalized, as I have noted. Where a 
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monopolies subject to other jurisdictions, there a e 
regulatory confusion. What is a fair price for what? Can the 
liated entity be audited? How does one calculate rate 
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Conclusion 
It is well possible that the SDG&E-SCE 
for may be some very unusual reasons. 
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But as a 
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proposition, mergers pose serious dangers w 
benefits. The current standard for approval is 
ut automatic 
does not reflect the balance the 
The notion that the regulator must find or some ly non-
existent intervenor must prove adverse consequences, although it 
appears to be the applicable test, reverses the proper 
presumption. Legislation should provide at both state and 
federal levels that the proponents of a merger must affirmatively 
demonstrate an enhancement of the public interest. 
There are two aspects of public interest benef which 
should be the focus of that showing. First, the proponent should 
be required to show, as a threshold matter, the impact of the 
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costs. to 
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL SHAMES 
BEFORE THE OCTOBER 24 HEARING OF SENATE COMMITTEE 
ON ENERGY AND PUBLIC UTILITIES 
The mergermania that has gripped California energy utilities 
in recent months poses a number of very complicated and profound 
questions. The most important of these questions are notable for 
their long-term significance: 
o What wil I be the structure of California's energy utility 
industry at the end of this century? 
o How will intrastate and interstate competition be affected? 
o Wil 1 the merger imperil the municipal energy utilities? 
These are but a few of the significant long-term questions 
that must be addressed if this Committee is to tackle the issues 
raised by the utility mergers. 
For today, I wish to focus my comments upon the concerns of 
the residential and smal 1 business customer class raised by the 
recent Tuscon and Edison merger proposals. The most frequently 
raised question by our members is how will these mergers affect 
our electric and gas rates? 
UCAN's evaluation has been hampered by SDG&E's delay and SCE's 
failure to make public any substantiative documentation for their 
respective promises to lower rates. 
Our preliminary assessment suggests that neither merger will 
directly lead to appreciably lower rates. SDG&E's rates have 
been dropping since 1985 and should continue to drop until the 
end of this decade. Aggressive and astute energy practices wil 1 
keep rates at reasonable levels through the next decade. The 
Tuscon merger merely throws into doubt SDG&E's ability to exploit 
the energy marketplace. 
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nw i e E s n rgy ates pea be g and may 
each par y with SDG&E's by ext yec.r. Edison's promise to 
uc s &E rates ~100 mi II ion, f a merger is approved, 
ms a infla enticement. The on y way t at such a 
red ction would be approved by the CPUC is if Edison could show 
syste~wide efficiencies stemming from the merger of the SCE and 
s E s stems. SCE would probably not be permitted to engage in 
a discriminatory reduction of San Diego rates without comparably 
lowering its own rates in Orange, Los Angeles and Inland Empire 
ounties. 
Thus, very little heed should be paid to either utility's 
ndocumented promises to lower rates. 
The other frequent question raised by UCAN's members is the 
a e upon customer service and responsiveness by either merger. 
AN sees little evidence to suggest that either merger would 
e hance the utility's responsiveness to the needs of its 
o r 
E: e ord, sho d not t uc ..t. has been a frequent 
rna g ment co e nee ts treatment of its 
a 1 e cu tamers. We have als note son's ability to foster 
a good customer rapport and a reputation for compGtant 
eme Altho g in recent ars DG&E has improved its 
etance and customer responsiveness, there is still a very 
a tractiveness to the p aspect of ison's take-over of 
S E's operations; much as a shopper would cherish the take-over 
K-Mart by the management of Nordstroms. 
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Frankly, Edison's track record has prompted a large number 
our members to welcome it~ proposed take-over of SDG&E. 
But UCAN is very concerned that Edison's alleged management 
prowess may we! I be offset by San Diego's loss of a locally based 
utility. If the Edison merger occurs, San Diego would become one 
of the largest, if not the largest, city in this country without 
a locally based utility company. 
San Diego's civic leaders are painfully aware of the cost 
that is imposed when a city loses a major company headquarters. 
We note that SDG&E's record of donations to San Diego civic and 
charitable organizations, while not particularly generous, is as 
much as five times that of Pacific Bell, which serves as San 
Diego's telephone utility but is headquartered in San Francisco. 
Of greater concern toUCAN is the fact that San Diego's 
future is indelibly tied to its energy future. A power utility 
should be dependent upon the health of the community it serves, 
so that there is a mutuality of interest. Either merger wi II 
diminish that commitment to the future of San Diego. Any merger 
approval must be conditioned upon a mechanism that would ensure 
mutuality of commitment. 
There are four additional concerns that are somewhat 
technical, but which directly impact residential customers. 
First, UCAN is very concerned about the recent expansions of the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's jurisdiction. The loss of 
a local utility headquarters is dwarfed by the potential loss of 
state regulatory control of its energy utilities. The Tuscan merger, 
sti ny 
cula:r, c ! E o a signif can egu ato:ry 
and would be det:r mental to alI San Diegans and a l 
an g s ative action, in the guise of a :resolution 
0 m cif i c egislation, may be nec~ssary to ensure that the 
C UC retains sufficient jurisdiction over any merged utility. 
Second, both mergers could wei I undermine the nascent 
mpe ition in the energy production industry that has been 
nurtured by state and federal policy. In particular, the Edison 
merger could significantly erode the movement made towards 
t g competition in the energy industry. It is UCAN's 
osition that competition, if properly encouraged, will benefit 
large and small customers. It is our hope that the competitive 
impacts of both mergers are careful Jy considered by this 
com tee. 
Third, if either merger is approved, the CPUC will confront 
a ace unting and cost-al location nightmare that could cause 
ine fo t e est of aud tors. Wee pect tat the CPUC wil 
ta k ca e to creatE echanisms that would revent cross-
za ns mong c sto er c as an v ce areas. But 
e on e ne t t the C lJ u sta is not 
c e ly equipped to effectively scru inizc the accounting 
in s of a merged utility. We urge the committee to find 
f increasing funding for experienced auditors at the 
o ission. 
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r ina e:r obably our greate t concern. It 
valves t e existing statues which address the ability of 
o g o~anies to purchase power utilities. 
In re ponse to a complai t by SDG E against Edison's recent 
rchase of SDG&E stock, Commissioner Wilk issued eight very 
ant questions about t e PUC's statutory irectives and 
jurisdiction. These thoughtful questions should be mandatory 
reading for this Committee, since they bear directly upon many of 
the issues before us today. With ut going into detail, 
Commissioner Wilk's questio s mandate a rev ew, by the Committee, 
0 ub i Utilit es Code ecs. 85 et seq. 
egislative guidance is also ecessary for the proper 
valuation of the mergers. The Commission wil! be asked to 
erm ne hether eithe m rge is in the pub! c interest". 
f e r eeks of egula ory hearings an imposing record of often 
icting testimony wil e accumulated. The Commission w i l I 
ed w th f ;ro gh e 
d t r X sagreements in an 
f e e ppro ed. 
m i s on w i l be 
eb a d h c in erest. 
te ing y, t ere is t e cons ns s abou what the public 
is or w o 5 e u e 0 pr The omm ssion will 
acknowledge that it has app ied dif erent standards in different 
5 s to reach d fferent res n the erger question. 
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a e a~ g u e d that a m o d b approved 
teres " s no a v rse y af ected. The 
t ad ted his " -ha m, o-
ev e . 
UCA does not believe hat this passive standard offers 
u cien rotection o the i c. Given the utility holding 
c ab ses hat we, the nation saw at the turn of the 
cent ry and the importance of the energy commodity to our state 
economy, these mergers should not be taken lightly. To approve a 
ation of utility monopolies on the premise that it 
e appear to harm the public is perilous. 
UCAN believes that this committee should take appropriate 
action to ensure that the Commission not approve any merger 
t been shown that a merger will the pub! ic. 
e kes are far tao high. The long-range implications are too 
refound. The expedited administrative proceedings that wil I be 
s a e ns ic to 
so 
:r i 
i g , CA 
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SDG&E announced that they were decl SCE's of SCE 
Corp. responded by stating that they would continue to 
pursue the acquisition of SDG&E, which has now resulted 
"hostile takeover." This same utility which has stated 
in a 
that 
would reduce the rates by 10%t 1,000 SDG&E 
oyees, provide better or 1 serv 
tion, is also same util ich f 
Tucson - San Diego Gas & Electr 
This same util 
at a cost above what can be 
To clarify this, SCE Corp. has a 
Energies. Mission Energ 
, they al 
and regulations of 
, better known as FERK, 
excess power to a il 
power at a rate that 
2 
was ant 
isi-
that a 
to sell to the con-
sed on the 
ision known as 
the process of 
Under the 
Energy Com-
to 
must purchase 
purchased on 
or a 
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verse impacts upon 
ies may fend off 
chasing enough of its own 
the seekers. In 
come heavily indebted 
sell off assets. A survey 
80,000 members of AFL-CIO a 
such 
or 
1987 showed that more than 
had lost the 
Testimony to Senate ComGitted on Energy ano Public Utilities 
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Ass-embly Comrrd t tee on Uti 1 it i es and Comrr,er c e 
Joint l'ieet in; 
Monday, October 2L.r, 19t:,f 
SubJect: San Diego Gas & Electric 
The Greater San Diego Chamber of Commerce Q_Q_poses the 
at t 17. p t by 5o u the r n C a 1 if or n i a Ed i son to a c: q u 1 e San D i ego 
Ga~ L Eiec:tric and assume its service territory. The 
Chamt::.er position 1s not based upon any antipathy toward 
S.C.E. nc.r a belief that it is not a good util1ty. On the 
ccntre;ry, an investigat1on leads to the conclu<::ion that 1t 
i5 c,n e>cellert operc;tion serv1ng 1ts territory well and 
provid1ng rewa'ds and incentives to its employees and stoc~ 
hc,lde,s. 
The v1e,-; the Chambers too~, as we believe 1t rr'u5t, 1s 
to thin~ of community bene~1t rather than, but net 
de r o g .s t 1 o n , o f t r, e 1 n a n a r r o "'-' i n t e r e s t s o f r a t e p a v e r , 
stoc~ holders, and employees. Those latter three are 
irrpDrtant an·d must not be ignored in any final resolution. 
e t s 5 v o 1 c e :: m u s t s p e c;, >-· f o r t t> e c: o rr. m u i t y a s i t n o w 1 s , 
r,o can becorre. 
I>'Duld 
place 
p su 
We b e c 2 r.-, e c o n v 1 n c e d t h a t the g r e a t e r c o rr, rn u r, i t y 
be 
to 
t·e:::t served by allowing the proven 
resrond to the challenges of Sall 
strateg a ready formulate to serve t 
management 
D1ego and 
good 
in 
to 
t e area. 
proposed rn <ger wou d c ea d e gge:: p ~ l1c 
the U.S. at least u t it encou<c;,ges otr,er 
ergc=-rs. 8Jt, wo db C; be be 7 HoV'Jever ff•UCh it 
p S.C.E. to f nd a hi r-. growth a a to util1ze 1 s 
c ;::cc:lty, would be rough on n comr.,•.Jn: y. This 
-, would gr-at• a hig port n f t e et ent on of 
the egulatcry authorities and would st f1e nnovation. 1n 
the h1ghly regulated and ter itorially monopo istic ut1lity 
dustry, the new ideas and services originate from a 
diversity of companies across various territories. Their 
successes prorr·pt emulation by others with good 
anagement. Errors are also rapidly disseminated and are 
1nstructive. 
The huge wealth of this new company would dominate the 
utility industry. It would have no incentive to innovate or 
to accommodate new ideas. Regulation can govern and control 
exces:: but it cannot stimulate. We face the prospector 
differences which are not meaningful, 1n an atmosphere of 
zero ris~, zero gain. 
Wil lia Nelson 
October 2t.;, 1988 
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Let me also take th out ha he 
anagement of S.D.G.&E. over years has been 
exemplary in the true sense of word. They have 
honestly admitted their errors intelligently faced 
their problems, and have produced a owerful strategy to not 
only meet the problems 
bu to position their company r b tter ser ice for 
decades. Obviously, this is good in a d rect sense, less 
obviously, it lS as an example to al of our othe 
businesses. During many years, S .G.&E as been a willing 
contributor of executive talent t o r community efforts,. 
T eir latest efforts raise this c n ribu o o a new level 
of exemplary conduct. 
ain while we salu e 
a k t hefT, f o p o i n i n g o u t 
Mr. Page has built. 
a 
r 
ul 
1 y, we also 
ement te rT, 
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COMMENTS OF THE UTILITY WORKERS UNI • REGION 5 
ON 
In general, labor does not support mergers as it results in 
the loss of Union jobs. These jobs provide ~ages and 
benefits that still enable Americ n citizens, through hard 
work and perseverance, to buy homes, send children to college 
and have access to adequate medical care and retirement. 
Union jobs also promote safety and dignity in the workplace. 
We carry the fight for these ideals for all working men and 
women, Union and non-Union. We now number 17-18% of the work 
force and this presence benefits al working people as the 
standard employers must meet to gain the services of the work 
force. The loss of any ion job is a loss to all working 
people. Southern California Edison Corporation's (SCE Corp) 
merger plans are therefore particularly offensive since they 
include the los f 5 as 
and Electric Compa 
Simultaneously the E r offer es the same or 
increased employee benef ta to S 1 y In f ct SCE 
is currently cutting benefits to ta own employees up to 40% 
by formulating a medical lan o d req re families to 
make copayments of $200 to $5 per month by the end of the 
proposed 4 year contract t a n i t eir medical 
benefits. It would r more ex e ve if they actually 
were to use the plan by beco ing ill a needing care. This 
opens the door for hard working Americans. whose labor built 
the pany, to lose homes and other investments, or to 
neg ect their medical needs, and the needs of e r amilies 
in order to prevent financ al disasters. 
is comes from a company. S ich ha h 8 ye rs of 
record profits. It is very unlikely that SCE would maintain 
or increase the benefits of another utility's employees under 
these conditions, conditions which include reducing eir 
work force by nearly 25%. 
The Utility Workers Union of America recognizes the strong 
federal and corporate influences presently favoring utility 
mergers. Given our understanding of utility operations, and 
our expansion from traditional labor issues, we offer further 
perspective on e merge s bein con red in Southern 
lifornia. 
SCE h s promise o low r 
recent y raised its own es e tial 
rate 1 , yet 
era rat s 11%, 
largely due to self dealing with it sis er subsidiary, 
Mission ergy. is trend is likely to continue as SCE 
promotes, rough as on Energy, ver pens ve purchased 
pover resources, and the utility continues to move more of 
e burden of these purchases on to e residential consumer. 
SCE and SDG&E, through its proposed erger with cson 
_,_ 
Electric Power Co., is moving to acquire long term access to 
coal fired capacity, which costs about 1/2 to 1/3 as much as 
gas fired capacity, and 1/4 the cost of purchased power. The 
combined utility would have nearly 1/3 of its generation mix 
supplied by this inexpensive coal capacity, guaranteeing 
markets for this capacity and lowering costs to Southern 
California ratepayers. 
SCE, on the other hand, appears committed to acquiring 
expensive purchased power to meet generation needs, a cost 
which is passed on directly to the consumer. This is 
particularly significant when it is noted that fuel and 
purchased power is the greatest single expense of a utility. 
Given the diverse directions SCE and SDG&E appear to be 
headed, and SDG&Eioutstanding performance prospects, it is 
understandable that SCE would move to acquire SDG&E without 
including Tucson Electric Power. is would keep Southern 
California consumers captive to expensive power purchases, 
and prevent comparisons between these nei boring utilities1 
rates and performances, eliminating the adverse effects such 
comparisons could have on the ratemaking process and in 
attracting investor capital. 
Finally, because the merger between SCE and SDG&E would 
evidently be hostile, it will be very costly. These costs 
will be borne by all - the ratepayers. investors and 
-3-
employees who must sacrifice to pay for this merger. e 
only "winners" in this type of speculation are the investment 
bankers and Wall Street enthusiasts. 
Very respectfully ~ubmitl"\~' 
(\1 u \) \ 
By ~~J., .. L-/-- ~/u h ·)) 
Bernardo R. Garcia 
Business Agent, Local 246 
Utility Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO 
10355 Los Alamitos Boulevard 
Los Alamitos, Ca 90720 
(213) 594-8881 

